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THEORIES  of the origins of inflation and the effects of price increases on 
a mixed market economy abound; as a result, there is no widespread con- 
sensus as to how to restrain inflation efficiently while maintaining high 
employment levels and a healthy rate of economic growth. There is little 
dispute, however, that the government's varied microeconomic policies 
have substantial price effects. At a time when inflation is a major concern 
and there is no accepted general policy for its containment, the federal 
government  should explore ways to lower the price level through a variety 
of basically microeconomic policy decisions. 
This paper focuses on options that are currently available to the fed- 
eral government for lowering the price level. While these options are dis- 
parate and not easily synthesized into a simple framework, most have a 
similar theme:  pursuing objectives  through direct rather than indirect 
taxation, where "indirect taxation" includes government-mandated cost 
increases for producers of private goods and services. For a number of 
reasons, government programs are often financed through increases in 
producer  costs rather than through direct payments from general govern- 
ment revenues. In some instances, such as when user taxes  are levied, 
there is an equity or efficiency reason for doing so.  In others, such as 
health and safety regulation, the reason is largely pragmatic: mandating 
cost increases for producers is simply the easiest (not the most efficient) 
means of achieving the desired objective. But in still other cases, such as 
agricultural  policies or minimum wage legislation, programs are financed 
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through  increases  in the price level because  direct payments  to the tar- 
geted  population  might  not pass the scrutiny  of the electorate. 
In this  paper  I do not analyze  the efficiency  gains  that  could  be derived 
from various  proposals.  These gains are likely to be large and are often 
related  to price-level  effects,  if only imprecisely.  For instance,  a less "in- 
flationary"  farm  policy is also likely to increase  allocative  efficiency.  The 
same  is true  for deregulation  of the airline  industry.  In a few cases,  such  as 
the deregulation  of natural  gas, crude  oil, and petroleum  products,  how- 
ever,  the efficient  policy would  lead to higher  deregulated  prices,  and the 
inflationary  cost of such a policy shift would then have to be weighed 
against  its benefits.  But these are the exceptions.  Most of the initiatives 
discussed  here can be embraced  both by those interested  in eliminating 
economic waste and by those concerned  with containing  the upward 
movement  of the price  level. 
Calculating  the Effects  of Policy Initiatives  on the Price Level 
In addition  to monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  the federal  government  has 
a major  influence  on the price level through  the payroll  taxation  for old 
age and  survivors,  disability,  and  health  insurance;  indirect  taxation,  agri- 
cultural  price supports;  economic  regulation  of such industries  as com- 
munications  and transportation;  social regulation  of the environment, 
health,  and safety;  trade  protection;  minimum  wage legislation;  and sub- 
sidization  of health insurance.  In a single paper,  it is impossible  to esti- 
mate the full effects on the price level of all policies pursued  in these 
areas.  However,  I present  estimates  for some elements  of each and sug- 
gest alternative  policies that might achieve the same goals at a lower 
social cost and  with a smaller  effect  on the price  level. 
In the sections  that  follow I attempt  to estimate  the effects  on the price 
level of various  policies,  using a consistent  methodology.  In each case, I 
calculate  an initial  (first-round)  effect  on the price  of the affected  good or 
service  produced  in the private  sector.  I then  pass  this  price  effect  through 
to finished  goods on a dollar-for-dollar  basis and calculate  its share of 
gross private domestic product. The relative importance  of the price 
change  is deduced  from: 
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where  pi is the price  of output  in the ith sector;  q?  is the initial  output  of 
the ith sector;  VA  is valued added in the ith sector; V. is the value of 
private  domestic  product;  and  P1,  is the domestic  private  deflator.  I essen- 
tially calculate  a Laspeyres  index of the effect  of various  microeconomic 
policies on the price level. In only a few cases are substitution  or own- 
price  effects  computed. 
I specifically  avoid estimating  any effects from these changes  in the 
price level throughout  the economy  over time because there is no gen- 
eral  consensus  about  the appropriate  structure  of wage-price  equations  in 
a macroeconomic  model. It remains an open question whether  prices 
affect  wages through  their influence  on workers'  expectations,  through 
increases  in the nominal marginal-value  product of labor, or through 
escalator  provisions.1  In fact,  whether  such  a feedback  between  prices  and 
wages  exists  at all is a subject  of debate.2  In another  paper  in this volume 
George  Perry  provides  new insight  on this question,  and concludes  that 
there  is some  evidence  of a price-wage  effect  in recent  U.S. wage  behavior. 
He argues  for government  cost-cutting  measures  as an important  com- 
ponent  of a comprehensive  anti-inflation  policy. 
Social  Security 
The 1977 amendments  to the Social Security  Act were designed  pri- 
marily  to place the old age and  survivors,  disability,  and  health  insurance 
(OASDHI) trust  funds  in a more solvent  position.  Except for health  in- 
surance,  these  funds  were  running  large  deficits  in 1977. The deficits  were 
projected  to grow  substantially  in the next  few years,  in part  because  of the 
rapidly  rising  benefit  levels and the increasing  cost of disability  benefits. 
To amend  the act, the Congress  could choose among  raising  the payroll 
tax rates, increasing  the taxable  wage base, or tapping  general  revenue 
for the trust  funds.  Moreover,  if it chose  to increase  payroll  taxes,  it could 
increase  employee  contributions,  employer  contributions,  or both. The 
Senate  bill and the administration's  proposal  would have placed  more of 
the burden  on employers,  but the final  legislation  more  nearly  paralleled 
1. See Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  BPEA, 1:1971, 
pp. 105-58. 
2.  See Robert E. Hall, "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market,"  BPEA, 
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Table 1. Effect  of the Social Security  Revisions  of 1977 on the Tax Rate and on the 
Taxable  Wage  Base, 1978-81 
Total 
cost of 
OASDHIa  tax rate  (percent)  Taxable  wage  base (dollars)  revisions 
(billions 
Year  Old law  New law Change  Old law  New law  Change  of dollars) 
1978  6.05  6.05  0  17,700  17,700  0  ... 
1979  6.05  6.13  0.08  18,900  22,900  4,000  6.4 
1980  6.05  6.13  0.08  20,400  25,900  5,500  9.4 
1981  6.30  6.65  0.35  21,900  29,700  7,800  18.4 
Source: Summary  of the Conference  Agreement  on H.R. 9346: The Social Security Amendments  of 1977 
House Committee on Ways and Means, 95:1,  WMCP: 95-61 (Government Printing Office, 1977). 
a.  Old age and survivors, disability, and health insurance. 
the House version  of the amendments,  which  required  equal  increases  in 
employer  and  employee  taxes. 
It is reasonable  to assume  that employer  contributions  are reflected  in 
product  prices  because  they  raise  the total costs of compensating  workers 
and thus unit labor  costs. Employee  taxes are simply  a mildly  regressive 
form of income taxation,  which reduce employees'  after-tax  incomes.8 
Placing  less emphasis  on employer  contributions  and more on employee 
taxes or general  revenue  financing  is therefore  likely to have more  bene- 
ficial effects on price levels in the short run if labor supply is price 
inelastic. 
The final bill enacted by the Congress,  which delayed the increases 
until 1979 and raised employee and employer  taxes equally, is among 
the less inflationary  choices  it could have made  from  the major  proposals 
before  it. The changes  in the tax rates  and  the new ceilings  for the income 
base are shown in table 1. The total cost of these changes  in terms of 
additional  contributions  to OASDHI  is $6.4 billion  in 1979, $9.4 billion 
in 1980, and  $18.4 billion  in 1981. 
At present  there  is growing  support  for utilizing  general  revenue  financ- 
ing of the disability  and health  programs.  In 1977, tax receipts  for these 
two programs  totaled $25.7 billion.4  It has been argued  that health in- 
surance  differs  from  old age and survivors  insurance  and disability  insur- 
3. However, Gordon, in  "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," p.  121, finds 
that about one-seventh of employee direct taxes are shifted forward by workers. 
4. Background Materials for  Hearings on  Social  Security, Subcommittee on 
Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 95:1, WMCP: 95-40 
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ance because  it does not pay benefits  in proportion  to a worker's  past 
contributions  and  because  benefits  are  not based  on this wage  experience. 
Thus, severing  health insurance  funds from payroll-tax  funding  would 
not impair  the structure  of the old age  retirement  system  in social  security. 
However,  general  revenue  financing  of disability  insurance  would create 
problems  of justifying  current  eligibility  requirements  and of distinguish- 
ing it from the supplemental  security  income program,  which provides 
benefits  to the elderly,  blind, and disabled.  If the disability  and health 
insurance  contributions  from  employees  and employers  were  replaced  by 
general  revenue financing-as  specified  in H.R. 10754, which is now 
being debated-the  employer  contributions  would decline by approxi- 
mately $14.6 billion in fiscal year 1979.5 This would place downward 
pressure  on unit  labor  costs and  therefore  prices,  approximately  offsetting 
the forthcoming  employer  tax increases  in the OASDHI  for 1979-81. 
Substitution  of Direct  for  Indirect  Taxes 
There  can  be little  doubt  that  indirect  taxes,  such  as general  sales  taxes, 
manufacturers'  excise taxes, customs duties, and sumptuary  taxes add 
directly  to the price of the market  basket of goods purchased  by con- 
sumers.  Moreover,  changes  in these taxes should be reflected  in prices 
rather  quickly.  Okun has suggested  that the federal government  substi- 
tute direct  taxation  for sales taxes in order  to achieve  a one-time  reduc- 
tion in the price level.6  The potential  effects  on the price level of such a 
reduction  are the most pronounced  of any of the microeconomic  propos- 
als  in this  paper. 
Most indirect  taxes are  levied at the state  and  local levels. In 1977, the 
federal  government  received  only $17.4 billion in excise taxes and $5.3 
billion  in customs  duties,  a total of 6.1 percent  of its tax receipts.7 
At the state and local levels, sales taxes account for approximately 
30 percent  of all tax receipts,  a total of $63.8 billion in 1977. Some of 
these are sumptuary  taxes that would not easily be given up for direct 
5.  Congressional Budget Office, "Comparison of  the Impacts of  a Cut in the 
Hospital Insurance and Disability Insurance Payroll Taxes with Those of the Ad- 
ministration's  1978 Tax Cut Proposal" (CBO, February  24, 1978; processed). 
6. Arthur M. Okun, "The Great Stagflation Swamp," Challenge, vol. 20  (No- 
vember/December 1977), pp. 6-13. 
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federal  transfers,  but the general  sales taxes  might  be a target.  Obviously, 
any program  to reimburse  states for rescinding  their sales taxes could 
place the federal government  in the position of redistributing  income 
across  states.  In 1976, Hawaii,  for instance,  collected  sales  taxes equal  to 
5.2 percent  of its personal  income  while  five states  had no sales  tax at all. 
Some minimum  grant  related  to income could be paid to states without 
sales taxes. But in order  to avoid  major  redistributions  across  states,  the 
amount  of sales tax for which  federal  grants  were  substituted  would  have 
to be limited. 
For instance,  if every state were to reduce  its sales tax receipts  by 1 
percent  of personal  income originating  in the state, with the revenue  to 
be replaced  by, say, half (0.5 percent) in state income tax and the re- 
mainder  in federal revenues,  there would be little if any redistribution 
across  states.  The federal  tax system  is mildly  progressive  in terms  of per- 
sonal income per capita.8  The substitution  of federal  revenues  for state 
sales taxes would most likely result  in an increase  in the progressivity  of 
the general  tax structure. 
How much of state sales taxes could be bought back? In 1976, all 
state and local sales taxes, including  sumptuary  taxes, amounted  to 4.1 
percent  of personal  income, or 5.2 percent  of personal  consumption  ex- 
penditure.  General  state sales taxes were approximately  one-half of this 
total. The distribution  of the ratios  of these general  sales tax receipts  to 
personal  income is shown  in table 2. Most states cluster  between  0.015 
and 0.030. Therefore,  a buyback  of sales tax revenues  up to 2 percent  of 
personal  income  might  be feasible  without  major  redistributive  effects.  If 
the federal  government  offered  50 percent  of each reduction  up to 2 per- 
cent  of personal  income,  the Treasury's  bill would  have  been $12.4 billion 
in 1976.9  The total reduction  in sales tax available  from such a buyback 
would be an estimated  $27.4 billion in 1977 or 1.6 percent of gross 
8. The personal income tax, which generates nearly one-half of federal govern- 
ment receipts, is related to personal income per capita as follows: 
personal  income tax = 0.0569 + 0.928 X 10-5  per capita income 
personal income  0 
based on a 51-state cross-sectional  regression  using 1974 data. The elasticity of the 
tax rate with respect to personal income per capita is 0.46 at the point of means. 
9.  If the five states not utilizing a sales tax were given 1 percent of personal in- 
come as part of the program,  the federal outlay would have risen by only $0.3 billion 
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Table  2. Distribution  of Ratios of State General  Sales Tax Revenue  to Personal 
Income  of the State, 1976 
Ratio of sales tax  Share of total U.S. 
revenuea  to personal  Number  of  personal  income 
income  of the state  states  (percent) 
O  (no sales tax)  5  2.32 
0.01 to 0.015  4  6.45 
0.Ol5toO.02  13  41.57 
0.02 to 0.03  20  43.57 
0.03to0.04;  4  1.90 
0.04 to 0.05  4  4  3.74 
O.  05 and over  1  0.45 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Quarterly  Summary  of State and Local Tax Revenue,  various issues, 
and Survey  of Current  Business, vol. 57 (August 1977). 
a.  General sales taxes and general gross receipts taxes. The latter are analogous to the former in their 
effects on the price level, but are levied on all business receipts rather than on retail sales. 
domestic private product.'0 If the federal government were to rescind its 
excise taxes in favor of an income tax, it might gain another 1.0 percent 
reduction in the private domestic deflator. In total, the federal govern- 
ment could potentially reduce indirect taxation by $44.8 billion, based on 
1977 revenues, yielding as much as a 2.7 percent reduction in the private 
domestic deflator. 
Even if a substitution of direct for indirect taxes reduced the price level 
in  the short run, problems in the long run could undermine this policy. 
In particular, a federal policy to buy back general sales taxes could be 
offset over time if the  states selectively  imposed  indirect taxes-hotel 
occupancy taxes, licensing fees based on revenues, increases in sumptuary 
taxes, or specific excise taxes of other forms. Given the present apparent 
preference for indirect over direct taxes in many states, this difficulty can- 
not be ignored. 
Agriculture 
The past five years have provided some breathing space for the formu- 
lation of a rational policy for agriculture. After the Russian wheat pur- 
chases in  1972-73  and a subsequent reduction in world grain stocks, 
10. Assuming that taxes on general sales and gross receipts  increased  at the same 
rate as personal consumption expenditures  from 1976 to  1977. Survey of Current 
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prices  of wheat  and feed grains  rose sharply.  In 1973, the average  price 
received  by farmers  for crops climbed  53.5 percent;  and in 1974 it rose 
another  28.0 percent  (see table  3). Resources  were  then  rushed  back  into 
agriculture  after  farm  incomes  rose to record  levels in 1973. As a result, 
for  a brief  period  the emphasis  in farm  policy  proposals  shifted  somewhat 
from  price supports  to price stabilization.11 
INCOME  SUPPORTS:  THE  CHOICE  BETWEEN 
DIRECT  PAYMENTS  AND  PRICE  ENHANCEMENT 
Unfortunately,  the respite  was brief. The old problems  in farm  policy 
returned  in 1977-78 after farm  income declined  from its 1973-74 pla- 
teau. The emphasis  turned  once again to raising  farm incomes through 
price  supports  and  direct  government  payments.  A combination  of politi- 
cal and budgetary  pressures  again  imparted  an inflationary  bias to agri- 
cultural  policy. While some progress  was made toward establishing  a 
rational  mechanism  for managing  a price-stabilizing  reserve  program,  the 
income-support  policies adopted in 1977-78  have been unnecessarily 
inflationary  with an emphasis  on redistributing  income to large farmers, 
rather  than  on supporting  the small,  family-owned  farm. 
The  1977-78  Policy  Setting.  In  1977,  because  of  mounting  pres- 
sure from farmers  whose real income from farming (excluding capital 
gains) had fallen to approximately  one-half of its 1973 level, Congress 
faced a choice of raising  farm income through  direct government  pay- 
ments  or through  price  supports.  It chose a little  of each,  raising  the target 
prices  for wheat and corn  to $2.90 and $2.00 a bushel,  respectively,  and 
raising  the loan rate for corn to $2.00 while keeping the loan rate on 
wheat  at $2.25 a bushel.'2  This  reflected  a decision  to peg target  prices  on 
which government  payments  are calculated  at or near the "cost of pro- 
duction,"  while keeping the loan rate for wheat (which effectively  be- 
comes a price-support  floor) substantially  below the level of estimated 
costs. When calculating  the cost of production,  however, Congress  ac- 
11. See, for example, Government and the Nation's Resources, Report of the 
National Commission on Supplies and Shortages (GPO, 1976), chap. 7. 
12. The loan rate is the price at which the secretary  of agriculture  is authorized 
to make loans or purchases of the relevant crops. It therefore serves as a support 
price for commodity sales by all farmers. The target price is the price guaranteed 
to those farmers who participate in the program and is the basis for calculating 
direct  government  payments. 4w  00 
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Table  4. Estimates  of the Annual  Costs to Consumers  of 1977-78 Changes  in 
Agriculture  Policy 
Millions of 1977  dollars 
March  1978 
wheat, 
Increase  in price supports"  Set-asidesb  feed grain, 
and  soybean 
Feed  grains  Milk  Feed  grains  Wheat  initiatives"  Total 
810  140  445  445  1,775  3,615 
Sources: Milk, Council on Wage and Price Stability; March 1978 wheat, feed grain, and soybean initia- 
tives, USDA;  other figures are author's estimates. 
a.  Assumes that the price of feed grains rises by 15 cents per bushel of corn equivalent. 
b. Based on a participation rate for feed grains of 25 percent and an elasticity of demand of -0.5;  for 
wheat, these figures are  75  percent and  -0.5,  respectively. 
c.  Average of low and high yields. 
cepted  a methodology  that  included  a return  on the current  value  of land, 
which  continued  to rise  despite  declining  farm  income (see below). Thus, 
income  supports  were  structured  at least  partially  to ratify  the inflationary 
expectations  indicated  in agricultural  real estate  markets. 
The Food and Agriculture  Act of 1977 created  predictable  problems 
for the administration.  Feed grain stocks rose in response  to the sharp 
increase  in the loan rate  while  deficiency  payments  for wheat (the differ- 
ence between  the target  price and the market  price) placed considerable 
pressure  on the Department  of Agriculture  budget.  The administration's 
reaction  was the use of acreage  "set-asides."113  In early 1978, set-asides 
were announced  of 10 percent  of feed grain acreage  and 20 percent  of 
wheat acreage.  These added nearly $900 million to consumer  costs in 
addition  to the $800 million  from the increased  loan rate on feed grains 
created  by the 1977 act (see table  4). In March  1978, the administration 
announced  further  output-limiting  policies, including  payments  for di- 
verting  feed grain  and cotton acreage  and additional  incentives  to graze 
wheat  rather  than to harvest  it. The effect  of the March  initiatives  was to 
increase  the cost of farm  commodities  by $1.78 billion annually.  In addi- 
tion, milk price supports  were raised to add another $140 million to 
annual  food costs. 
Why  have these various  forms  of price enhancement  been chosen for 
supporting  farm  incomes  and stabilizing  prices?  If the objectives  of agri- 
13. The term "set-asides"  refers to the requirement  that farmers retire a specified 
percentage  of  their acreage during the crop year in order to participate in price 
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cultural  policy are  price  and  income  stability  and  the support  of the small 
family  farm,  why  not allocate  government  payments  to the smaller,  strug- 
gling  farmer  in periods  of generally  low farm  income,  while managing  a 
commodity  reserve  program  to stabilize  prices? Part of the answer  is, 
quite  simply,  that  the apparent  objective  of current  farm  policy  is to main- 
tain  the  incomes  of all farmers-particularly  the large  farm  operators. 
Agriculture  is obviously  not a sector  dominated  by small  family  farms. 
Since 1973, roughly  the top 5 percent  of farm operators  have received 
between  55 and 60 percent  of total cash receipts.  These large farmers, 
with annual  receipts  of $100,000 or more, averaged  $93,748 in net farm 
income  in 1973, $9,406 in off-farm  income,  and $94,116 in capital  gains 
(the accrued  rise  in value  of farm  real estate), or a total of $197,270 per 
operator  (see table 5). 
The decline  in farm  income  from 1973 to 1976 (the most recent  years 
for which  detailed  data  are available)  was most  pronounced  among  large 
farmers.  The farms  with the largest  sales in table  5 show the sharpest  de- 
cline  in total  income,  with  or without  capital  gains.  But despite  this  decline 
in fortune,  farmers  with annual  receipts  in excess of $40,000 a year con- 
tinued  to earn  healthy  returns  on their  investment.  The return  on equity 
shown  in table  5 is not adjusted  for the opportunity  cost of the operator's 
labor, but even if, say, $15,000 a year were deducted  from income for 
this purpose, the return  would not fall below 16 percent for the two 
largest  categories  of farms.  On the other  hand,  a similar  allowance  would 
reduce  the return  to a low level for smaller  farmers.  In short,  the largest 
farmers  continued  to prosper  in 1976 while returns  on capital for the 
smaller  farmers  were much less satisfactory.  But it was the decline in 
income  for the large  farmers  that  generated  the impetus  for the 1977-78 
farm  policy approved  by Congress  and the administration. 
Alternative Mechanisms for Supporting Farmers' Incomes.  In  1977, 
Congress  could have chosen to increase  farm  incomes  by relying  on de- 
ficiency  payments,  price  supports,  or direct  payments  scaled  in proportion 
to the perceived  economic  needs of different  farm  operators.  Direct  pay- 
ments, however,  whether  in the form of deficiency  payments  or other 
mechanisms,  are so visible  that Congress  feels it must  impose  ceilings  on 
the level of payments  per farm.  In the 1977 act these ceilings  vary from 
$40,000 to $52,250 a year, depending  on the crop. Previous  experience 
with large  expenditures  on direct  payments  to farmers  demonstrates  that 
large  farmers  have obtained  a major  share  of the payments,  but they  have u 
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Table  6. Returns  per  Farm  from Alternative  Hypothetical  Policies for Distributing 
$4.4 Billion  to Farmers,  by Size of Farm 
1976 dolars 
Alternative  palicies 
Target-price  income 
supports  with  1970  Income  supports  with 
Pure  price  government  payments  equal  payments 
enhancement  distribution  distribution 
Farm  sales  (A)  (B)  (C) 
100,000 or more  16,842  8,567  1,577 
40,000-100,000  2,896  3,716  1,577 
20,000-40,000  1,382  2,346  1,577 
10,000-20,000  711  1,585  1,577 
5,000-10,000  353  918  1,577 
2,500-5,000  182  553  1,577 
Less than 2,500  57  217  1,577 
Source: USDA, Farmn  Income Statistics (July 1977). 
not enjoyed  payments  in proportion  to their share of total receipts.  In 
1969-71, for example,  the top 8 percent of farmers  received approxi- 
mately  one-third  of all direct  payments  from  the government;  their  farms 
received  more  than  50 percent  of all cash  receipts  from  farming. 
To compare  the distributional  effects of alternative  mechanisms  for 
supporting  farmers'  incomes, I assume that Senator  Talmadge's  objec- 
tives  represent  the 1978 consensus  in the Congress.'4  His initial  proposal 
would have increased  domestic  farm commodity  marketings  by an esti- 
mated $4.38 billion, compared  to the prices that could have been ex- 
pected  without  set-asides.  This  is enough  to restore  total  real  farm  income 
to more  than  its relatively  high 1972 rate.  Policy  A in table  6 assumes  that 
a pure  price-enhancing  set-aside  policy  will raise  farmers'  incomes  in pro- 
portion  to their 1976 gross  cash receipts.  A second  alternative  is a policy 
that  would  distribute  income  support  payments  in the same  relative  pro- 
portions  as those that occurred  in 1970 when there  were high price sup- 
ports (policy  B); a third  is one that  would  distribute  $4.38 billion  equally 
across  all farms (policy C). The results  show that a price-enhancement 
strategy  greatly  benefits  the farmers  earning  more than $40,000 at the 
expense of virtually  all the others. The 1970 pattern  of price-support 
payments  would give farmers  with sales in excess of $20,000 a year 
(1976 dollars)  more  than an equiproportional  share  of the $4.38 billion. 
14. Emergency  Agricultural  Act of 1978, S. Rept. 95-699, 95:2 (GPO, 1978). 414  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
Thus,  a direct  payment  scheme,  using  either  income-support  payments 
subject  to a ceiling  or an equal  payment  per  farm,  would  benefit  the small 
farmer  considerably  relative  to a price-enhancement  strategy.  Moreover, 
the direct  payments  would  not translate  directly  into price-level  effects  as 
would a commodity  price-enhancing  strategy.  The combination  of high 
loan rates and acreage  set-asides  is not only inflationary  but is also de- 
signed  to convey most of the benefits  to large farmers  who continue  to 
enjoy  large average  returns  on their  investments. 
Land Values and the Cost of Production.  Given the tendency of Con- 
gress to use price enhancement  as a means of redistributing  income to 
farmers,  it is unfortunate  that it has now settled  on a standard  based on 
cost of production  for setting target prices and, indirectly,  loan rates. 
These estimates  of the cost of production  include  a 3.5 percent  return  on 
the current  value of land, which  has risen  sharply  despite  declining  farm 
income. 
Throughout  the 1950s and 1960s, the value  of cropland  and  dairyland 
climbed  steadily.  This increase  followed a rise in net farm  income  with a 
short lag. In the 1970s, land values soared in response  to higher  farm 
prices  and,  therefore,  higher  farm  incomes.  However,  when  farm  incomes 
began  to decline  in 1974, the price of land continued  to rise. Predictions 
of 1972-76 land  values  were  based  on equations  that estimated  the effect 
of current  and lagged  net income  on land values  for 1955-71. The result 
was underestimation  for 1974, 1975, and especially 1976 (table 7). 5 
Actual land values  in Iowa and Kansas  approximately  doubled  between 
1972 and 1976, while realized  net income receded roughly  to its real 
1968-69 levels. Farmers  were apparently  expecting  further  income  gains 
in the near  future,  perhaps  from government  initiatives. 
PRICE  STABILIZATION 
While  agriculture  is a competitive  sector  of the economy,  not necessar- 
ily subject  to the downward  price rigidity  observed  in many labor and 
product  markets,  there are major reasons  why government  policies are 
needed  to stabilize  food prices  at some cost to economic  efficiency.  Food 
prices  comprise  a large share  of the cost of living and may have major 
15. Kansas, Iowa, and Wisconsin were chosen as typical wheat, corn, and dairy 
farming  states,  respectively. Robert W. Crandall  415 
Table 7. Actual  and  Predicted  Values  of Farm  Land  in Iowa, Kansas,  and 
Wisconsin,  1972-76a 
Indexes  of average  value per acre (1967 =  100) 
Iowa  Kansas  Wisconsin 
Year  Actualb Predicted  Actualb Predicted  Actualb Predicted 
1972  122  118  118  130  148  138 
1973  141  169  137  160  179  165 
1974  189  168  178  159  214  167 
1975  234  230  211  152  240  174 
1976  294  126  235  125  271  159 
Sources: USDA,  Farm Real Estate Market Developments,  CD-77 and CD-82 (July 1973 and July 1977); 
and USDA, State Farm Income Statistics, Supplement to Statistical Bulletin 576 (September 1977). 
a.  Land values regressed on current and two-period lagged net income, 1955-71. 
b. March of each year. 
effects on wage and price escalation  in other industries.'6  In addition, 
government  agricultural  income support  programs  now contain  features 
that may mean downward  price  inflexibility  for farm  commodities  in fu- 
ture  years.  Sudden  rises  in agricultural  prices  are  rather  quickly  translated 
into  increased  farm  land  values,  which  in turn  increase  the cost of produc- 
tion used to calculate  support  and target  prices. Hence the inflationary 
cost of repeating  the experience  of 1972-73 would  be enormous. 
To argue  that the government  should stabilize  farm prices does not 
mean that it can. It may be difficult  to devise operational  decision  rules 
for government  programs  that are stabilizing  in the presence of major 
exogenous  shocks. Moreover,  even if such policies were designed  well, 
political  forces may not allow them to operate  to increase  stability.17 
On the other  hand, there  is a general  consensus  that private  decisions 
do not always  lead to the optimal  level of agricultural  stocks. There are 
two reasons  for this: first, speculators  will not hold stocks for the low 
probability  of a large  return  because  government  policy will not permit 
them to realize market-clearing  prices during  periods of prospectively 
high returns  and, second,  private  decisions  fail to include  the social cost 
16. Food accounted for 23.7 percent of the consumer price index as of Decem- 
ber 1976. Food accounts for  19.3 percent and 17.7 percent of the two new CPIs 
introduced  in 1978. 
17. During the 1970s, the volatility of the crude food and feedstuffs  of the whole- 
sale price index actually declined relative to other crude materials,  despite the return 
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of inflation.  As a result,  it behooves  government  to subsidize  or to accu- 
mulate  stocks  to augment  those  held by private  investors  and  speculators. 
The Food and  Agriculture  Act of 1977 recognizes  this need by requir- 
ing the  establishment  of programs  both  to encourage  producer  storage  for 
wheat  and  feed grains  and to promote  U.S. participation  in international 
reserve  programs.  U.S. reserves  are  to be stimulated  by government  loans, 
payments  for storage  ($0.25 a bushel,  as set by the Department  of Agri- 
culture),  and  penalties  for sales from  these  reserves  in advance  of reach- 
ing prescribed  "trigger  points"  when sales could begin. These points are 
defined  in the act to be between  140 percent  and 160 percent  of the loan 
rate for wheat and at appropriate  levels for feed grains.  Wheat  is to be 
accumulated  in this planned  reserve  up to a total of 300 million to 700 
million  bushels.  The purpose  of these  reserves  is to "promote  the orderly 
marketing  of [the] commodities."  Lacking,  however,  are instructions  to 
insulate  the management  of this reserve  from  political  forces.'8 
Although  the reserve  program  may  resemble  the Houthakker  program 
for entering  future  markets  to stabilize  agricultural  prices,  it is at present 
little more than a stockpile  program.'9  Unanswered  are questions  con- 
cerning  how the size of the stockpile should vary over time, when the 
secretary  of agriculture  should  increase  diversions  through  augmentation 
of storage  payments,  or when feed grains should be released  from the 
reserve.20  Congress  could easily change the operation  of the stockpile 
during  a period  of rising  wheat  prices  by simply  raising  the (nonbinding) 
loan rate to within  40 percent  of the market  price. Finally, the pressure 
of political  forces  may lead to short-run  decisions  that are more destabi- 
lizing  than the usual cycle of support  payments,  loan rates, and acreage 
set-asides.21 
18. An example of these forces was an administration  decision in March 1978 
to forgive interest  payments  after one year for grain placed in government-subsidized 
reserves. This decision appears to have been based not on an assessment of  the 
optimal reserve, but simply on the political necessities of the moment. 
19. A description  of the Houthakker  program  appears  in Hendrik  S. Houthakker, 
Economic Policy for the Farm Sector (American Enterprise  Institute, 1967), chap. 7. 
20. The secretary has considerable  discretion in setting the level of payments to 
producers  for storing  the grain. 
21. An example of such political pressure is found in the administration's  new 
agricultural  policy initiatives of  March 29,  1978. While arguing that farmers' in- 
comes rose 15 percent over the previous year and grain prices increased over 30 
percent,  the initiatives announced plans to increase reserves considerably  through a 
reduction  in interest  charges. Robert  W.  Crandall  417 
SUMMARY 
Declining real farm income has spawned a set of income support 
policies  that are unduly  inflationary  because  of the political  necessity  of 
directing  the benefits  toward  large  farmers.  If the welfare  of smaller  farm- 
ers  were  the  principal  motivation  behind  1977-78 policies,  direct  govern- 
ment payments could have been utilized effectively with much less 
effect on the price level. A new policy of building  farm-commodity  re- 
serves  indicates  progress  in the drive to stabilize  farm prices, but even 
this policy is impaired  by the short-term  political necessity  to maintain 
farm  incomes. 
Government  ReguLation 
It is useful  for the purposes  of discussion  to divide  federal  government 
regulation  into at least two categories:  economic and social. Economic 
regulation  is the general  rate-setting  or price-setting  form of regulation 
that has long been in existence. While the ostensible  purpose of such 
regulation  is generally  to restrict  monopolistic  control  over price,  it often 
leads to implicit cartelization  of the regulated  firms and to prices (or 
rates) that are in excess of the cost of service.  In energy  markets,  how- 
ever, much of the current  regulation  represents  an attempt  to transfer 
economic  rents  from  producers  to consumers  while acknowledging  a loss 
in economic  efficiency. 
During the past decade, social regulation-largely environmental, 
health,  and  safety  regulation-has grown  so rapidly  that  it challenges  and 
perhaps surpasses  the economic forms of regulation  in its impact on 
prices and economic  efficiency.  It is in this newer area that the greatest 
opportunities  lie for changing  the government's  effect on the price level 
because  Congress  has generally  chosen to have it implemented  through 
the mandating  of cost-increasing  methods of control. This choice is a 
pragmatic  one, but it is rarely  coupled  with a requirement  that  the regula- 
tion  be efficient. 
ECONOMIC  REGULATION 
Of the government-regulated  transportation,  communications,  energy, 
banking,  and securities  industries,  only the transportation  industry  offers 418  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity,  2:1978 
important  opportunities  for reforms  that would decrease  the price level. 
Current  energy  regulation  reflects  an attempt  to restrain  the upward  ad- 
justment  of energy  prices in the short run, although  there is some evi- 
dence  that  the regulation  of gas pipelines  raises  prices.22  Communications 
regulation  is currently  being reformed  substantially  through  a variety  of 
court  tests and the inexorable  progress  of new technology.23  The securi- 
ties industry  is already  being persuaded  by the Securities  and Exchange 
Commission  to increase  competition,  and  the effect  of banking  regulatory 
reform  cannot  easily  be measured  in terms  of the price level. 
In the transportation  sector,  reform  would  mean  deregulation  of entry 
and  fare setting.  A step in this direction  has been taken  in the Kennedy- 
Cannon  bill, which would provide  greater  fare flexibility  and liberalize 
entry  into the interstate  airline  industry.  A similar  approach  is clearly 
possible  for trucking,  given the limited  economies  of scale in that indus- 
try.  Finally, amending  the current  cabotage  laws that restrict  the coastal 
trade to vessels manned  and built by U.S. labor would greatly reduce 
shipping  costs in the coastal trade  for the maritime  industry.  In each of 
these  transportation  sectors,  the need for deregulation  is evident.  In the 
absence  of regulation,  competitive  forces would operate  satisfactorily  in 
each, and there  would  be little reduction  in service  to small communities 
or small shippers.  Only in the case of the maritime  industries  could na- 
tional security  be used as an argument  for continuing  to maintain  rates 
above  market  levels, and even in this market  there  are other,  less expen- 
sive  means  for promoting  the  nation's  security. 
The prospective  net savings in fares from deregulating  the airlines, 
trucking,  and the coastal maritime  trade appear  in table 8. These esti- 
mates,  based on existing  studies,  are at best approximate  and do not in- 
clude  a measure  of deadweight  loss nor reflect  the shifts  among  modes  of 
transportation  that would occur. Full deregulation-a political  impossi- 
bility-would  lower transportation  costs by at least $5 billion and per- 
haps  $10 billion  a year. 
22. Stephen  G. Breyer and Paul W. MacAvoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal 
Power Commission (Brookings  Institution, 1974). 
23.  By this I do not mean that rewriting  the Communications  Act of  1934 or a 
government  victory in  United States vs. American Telephone & Telegraph Com- 
pany will not change the pace of deconcentration,  but only that competition is virtu- 
ally inevitable  in the telecommunications  industry. Robert W. Crandall  419 
Table  8. Potential  Price Effects  from Deregulating  Transportation  Industries,  1976 
Total  revenue  Price impact  from  Potential  annual  savings 
Industry  (billions  of dollars) deregulation  (percent)  (billions  of dollars) 
Airline  16.8  - 20to-30a  3.4to5.0 
Trucking  26.0b  -7  to-200  1.8 to 5.2 
Maritimed  n.a.  n.a.  0. 10 to 0. 15e 
Sources: U.S.  Civil Aeronautics Board,  Supplement to  the Handbook of  Airline Statistics,  Covering 
1975 and 1976 (GPO, 1977); and Interstate Commerce Commission, unpublished calculations. See also 
notes a, c, and e. 
n.a. Not available. 
a.  Based on data in George W. Douglas and James C. Miller III, Economic Regulation of  Domestic 
Air Transport:  Theory  and Policy (Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 90, and in Theodore E. Keeler, "Airline 
Regulation and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 3 (Autumn 1972), pp. 399-424. 
b. Motor carriers of property, classes 1, 2, 3. 
c.  Based on data in Thomas Gale Moore, Freight Transportation  Regulation: Surface Freight and the 
Interstate Commerce  Commission  (American Enterprise  Institute, 1972) and various studies cited therein. 
d. Cabotage laws. 
e.  Gerald R. Jantscher, Bread upon the Waters:  Federal Aids to the Maritime  Industries  (Brookings In- 
stitution, 1975), chap. 5. 
SOCIAL  REGULATION 
The  reform  of social  regulation  may  have  important  effects  on the price 
level. While  this type of regulation  can and does bring  substantial  bene- 
fits to society, there  is a need to provide  the agencies  responsible  for its 
execution  with  an incentive  to achieve  these  benefits  at the lowest  possible 
cost-an  incentive  that is currently  lacking. A rather  large number  of 
regulatory  authorities  are entrusted  with this newer type of regulation, 
including  the Environmental  Protection  Agency,  the Occupational  Safety 
and  Health  Administration,  the Food and  Drug  Administration,  the Con- 
sumer  Product  Safety  Commission,  the Federal  Aviation  Administration, 
the National Highway  Traffic  Safety Administration,  the Coast Guard, 
the Mining  Enforcement  and Safety  Administration,  the Department  of 
the Interior,  and  the Forest  Service  of the Department  of Agriculture. 
Of all the agencies  entrusted  with social regulation  listed above, the 
two having  the greatest  responsibilities  across  the breadth  of the economy 
and the largest  impact  on business  costs are the Occupational  Safety  and 
Health Administration  and the Environmental  Protection  Agency. The 
prospective  net social costs of their  regulations  is discussed  below. 
The Occupational  Safety and Health Administration.  There is no 
good source  of the total prospective  costs of OSHA's  regulation.  At best, 
the costs can be estimated  for the regulations  that have been promul- 
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Table  9. Prospective  Annual  Cost of Major Regulations  Proposed  or Promulgated 
by the Occupational  Health and  Safety Administration,  1974-77 
Annual  cost (1977 dollars)" 
Number  of 
workers  Total  Per protected 
Item regulated  Date proposed  protected  (millions)  worker 
Noise  October  24, 1974  206,700  1,985.3b  9,605b 
Arsenic  January21, 1975  7,400  125.3  16,932 
Coke ovens  July 31, 1975  29,600  262.6  8,872 
Sulfur  dioxide  November  24, 1975  14,000  177.4  12,671 
Lead  October  3, 1975  5,200  363.4  69,885 
Deep-sea diving  June 15, 1976  1,500  23.0  15,333 
Acrylonitrile  January  17, 1978  3,400  23.1  6,794 
Benzene  May27, 1977  191,000  503.6  2,637 
All items  ...  458,800  3,463.7  7,550 
Addendum 
Cotton dust  December  20, 1976  314,000?  717.5  2,285d 
Sources: Based on data in Occupational  Safety and Health Administration, Dockets OSH-llA,  OSH-37, 
H-017A, H-039, H-004, H-103, and H-052, respectively,  for first six items and last item in the table; sub- 
mission by the Council on Wage and Price Stability to OSHA, "Analysis of Proposed Benzene Standard," 
appendix, September 12, 1977, for benzene; unpublished data from the Council on Wage and Price Sta- 
bility, for acrylonitrile. 
a.  Deflated using the implicit GNP deflator for producers' durable equipment from the quarter of pro- 
posal. 
b. Assuming a 90/90  standard (scale of  dBA noise level), where the first number indicates the noise 
level for the initiation of engineering and administrative controls and the second number, the noise level 
for the use of hearing protectors. 
c.  Total employment, not the protected population. 
d. Minimum. 
mulgated.  Table  9 provides  a summary  of items  affected  by major  regula- 
tions, with the estimated  annual  cost and the number  of employees  to be 
protected  for each.  Most data are  drawn  from  the inflation  and economic 
impact  analyses  performed  for OSHA. 
An important  measure  of the impact  of OSHA  is the cost per protected 
worker.  In four  of the eight  cases  in which  this measure  can  be calculated, 
the cost of the agency's  proposed  regulations  exceeds  total average  earn- 
ings  per worker  in manufacturing.  The principal  reason  for this enormous 
cost is the reliance  on engineering  controls  rather  than on work  practices 
and personal protective  equipment.  Clearly, such costly regulations- 
if promulgated-will drastically  change the industries  affected  because 
many  will find  it unprofitable  to continue  operation  without  major  reduc- 
tions  in output. 
In 1977 dollars, the prospective  costs of the nine major regulations 
listed are $4.2 billion a year-0.25  percent  of the gross  private  product. 
Excluded  are  new  regulations  controlling  toxic substances  such  as manda- Robert  W.  Crandall  421 
tory labeling,  which could add several billion dollars a year, and the 
agency's  general  carcinogen  policy now under  development. 
In a recent article,  Edward  Denison estimated  that in 1975 the total 
annual  cost of the OSHA's  regulation  of the nonmining,  nonresidential 
workplace  was $972 million, or 0.09 percent of the nonresidential  net 
national  product.24  Thus, the prospective  costs of regulations  listed in 
table 9 are more than four times Denison's  estimates  for 1975. The im- 
pact  of this  type  of regulation  will undoubtedly  grow  in the next  few years. 
Environmental  Regulation.  To calculate  the prospective  cost of en- 
vironmental  regulation  in the next  few years,  a slightly  different  approach 
is taken. The Environmental  Protection  Agency has recognized  that its 
regulations  governing  air and water  will have the greatest  impact  on six 
industries:  electric power generation,  petroleum  refining,  steel, paper, 
copper,  and chemicals.  As a result,  the agency  has funded  analyses  of the 
total cost of controls  for each of these industries.  Only the study on the 
chemicals  industry  is incomplete  as of this  writing. 
It is estimated  that the prospective  cost of the first  phase of environ- 
mental  regulations,  excluding  new regulations  promulgated  in response 
to 1977 legislation,  will be $7.83 billion a year  in 1977 dollars (see table 
10). If enforcement  of these regulations  were  begun  in a timely  fashion, 
these costs, except for utilities,  would have been incurred  by 1977 and 
each year thereafter.  By 1983 (1985 for utilities), these costs will rise 
to $13.81 billion a year,  excluding  new regulations  under  study  currently 
at the Environmental  Protection  Agency.25 
These estimates  of environmental  costs for five major  industries,  com- 
bined with earlier  work on the industrial  distribution  of air control and 
water control (best-practicable-technology  standard,  or BPT)  outlays, 
may  be used to calculate  a prospective  total annual  cost of air and water 
pollution controls in the near term (1977 standards) and in the mid- 
1980s. Assuming  that the five industries  contribute  to total future  costs 
in the same proportion  as they do to current  air and BPT water con- 
trol costs, the prospective  cost for air and water  pollution  control  in the 
nonfarm  business  sector  of the economy,  excluding  the cost of controlling 
24.  Edward F. Denison, "Effects of  Selected Changes in the Institutional and 
Human Environment  upon Output per Unit of Input,"  Survey of Current  Business, 
vol. 58 (January  1978), pp. 21-44. 
25. These include new standards  for sulfur dioxide emissions from new sources, 
revision of  ambient air quality standards, a new lead standard, revision of  state 
implementation  plans under the Clean Air Act, and new approaches  to carcinogens. 422  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
Table 10. Prospective  Annual  Cost of Environmental  Controls  for Legislation  in 
Effect  in 1976,  Five Major Industries  and  All Industries,  1977 and 1983a 
Billions of 1977  dollars 
Industry  1977  1983 
Electric utility  4.28b  7.130 
Petroleum  refining  1.79  2.96 
Steel  0.90  2.36 
Pulp and paper  0.69  1.07 
Copper  0.17  0.29 
Total  7.83  13.81 
All industries  25.34  44.69 
Sources: Estimated using U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Planning and Evaluation, 
"Economic and Financial Impacts of  Federal Air and Water Pollution Controls of  the Electric Utility 
Industry: Technical Report," EPA-230/3-76-013 (EPA, May 1976; processed); ibid., "Economic Impact 
of EPA's Regulations on the Petroleum Refining Industry," pt. 1, EPA-230/3/76-004  (EPA, April 1976; 
processed); Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., "Analysis of Economic Effects of Environmental  Regulations 
on the Integrated  Iron and Steel Industry," vol. 1, EPA-230/3-77-015 (EPA, July 1977; processed); Arthur 
D.  Little, Inc., "Economic Impacts of Pulp and Paper Industry Compliance with Environmental  Regula- 
tions," vol.  1 (ADL,  nd; processed; available through National  Technical Information Service); ADL, 
"Economic Impact of Environmental Regulations on the United States Copper Industry," submitted to 
EPA (ADL,  January 1978; processed); all industries, estimated from L. P. Gianessi, H. M. Peskin, and 
E. Wolff, "The Distributional Effects of the Uniform Air Pollution Policy in the United States," discussion 
paper D-5  (Resources for the Future, March 1977; processed), table 1, and L. P. Gianessi and H.  M. 
Peskin, "The Cost to Industries of Meeting the 1977 Provisions of the Water Pollution Control Amend- 
ments of  1972," Contract No.  68-01-2817 (National Bureau of  Economic Research, January 1976; pro- 
cessed). 
a.  Assumes full enforcement of all control legislation in effect in  1976. Costs adjusted using implicit 
GNP deflator for producers'  durable  equipment. 
b.  1980. 
c.  1985. 
nonbusiness  automobiles,  is $25.34 billion annually  in the near  term  and 
$44.69 billion a year by the mid-1980s. This is decidedly  higher than 
the latest forecast  of the Council on Environmental  Quality  for private 
costs of water and stationary  air-quality  regulation  in 1985. In 1977 
dollars,  the council's  estimate  is $24.4 billion in annual  outlays  in addi- 
tion to those costs that  would  be borne  without  environmental  regulation, 
and $34.9 billion for all costs, whether  or not they are in response to 
regulation.26 
The above cost estimates  exclude mobile sources, although  the costs 
of controlling  these  sources  now exceed  those of stationary  ones. In addi- 
tion, these estimates  ignore  the costs of public  water  treatment  and solid 
waste management  because these are largely funded from general rev- 
enues  with  little  effect  on the  price  level. 
Denison's  estimate  of the incremental  cost of pollution abatement  to 
nonresidential  business mandated by  the  Environmental  Protection 
26. Environmental  Quality-1977,  The Eighth Annual Report of the Council on 
Environmental  Quality (December 1977). Robert W.  Crandall  423 
Agency and state and local authorities  is $9.55 billion for 1975, or ap- 
proximately  0.7 percent  of the net national  product.27  This is a remark- 
ably  small  total,  given  the pervasiveness  of environmental  regulation  and 
the above estimates.  In part, its small size indicates  that many enforce- 
ment  deadlines  for environmental  standards  had not yet been reached  in 
1975. As table 10 suggests,  these outlays will rise substantially  in the 
next few years. 
In summary,  the prospective  costs of environmental,  health,  and  safety 
regulation  will undoubtedly  be large  by the middle  of the next decade.  In 
many  cases, such as control  of air emissions  from stationary  sources,  the 
costs  may  be substantially  less than  the prospective  benefits,  but in others 
-such  as control  of mobile  sources-the  evidence  is far less conclusive. 
Regardless  of the merit  of the strictness  of environmental  or social con- 
trols,  the experience  of OSHA  and  the Environmental  Protection  Agency 
in setting standards  suggests  that there may be considerable  room for 
reducing  the cost of achieving  the desired  benefit  levels. A few examples 
of recent  or pending  decisions  will serve  to highlight  the absence  of cost- 
effectiveness  in regulatory  decisionmaking  in various  agencies. 
Occupational Exposure to Coke-Oven Emissions.  The standards pro- 
mulgated  by OSHA for coke-oven emissions  are illustrative  of the ten- 
dency for regulators  to specify engineering  standards  (mandating  the 
installation  of  given equipment) rather than performance  standards 
(specifying  the maximum  allowed  rate of exposure  to the risk in ques- 
tion). In this case, OSHA opted  for specific  engineering  controls  instead 
of a combination  of work  practices  and personal  protective  devices (res- 
pirators). The latter strategy  would have been much less expensive  but 
less easily enforced. Respirators  are uncomfortable  and are therefore 
likely to be ignored  by many  workers  for substantial  periods  of time. As 
a result,  OSHA requires  them only when the engineering  controls  fail to 
achieve  a desired  maximum  emissions  level. If they were required  for all 
workers,  regardless  of the effectiveness  of the engineering  controls,  greater 
protection  would  be afforded  the exposed  population.  On the other  hand, 
if they  were required  as a substitute  for the engineering  controls,  the an- 
nual  cost of the standard  would  have been substantially  less than $8,900 
per  protected  worker. 
Segregated  Ballast. The Carter  administration  proposed  in April 1977 
27. This is an "incremental"  cost over and above the expenditures  firms would 
have undertaken  in the absence of recent environmental  legislation. 424  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
that all tankers  serving  the U.S. market  should  be required  to segregate 
ballast  from  cargo.  This regulation  would apply  to both existing  and  new 
ships. The cost of retrofitting  ships and the effect of reducing  capacity 
because  of that  retrofitting  will be an estimated  $360 million  a year  based 
on the administration's  initial  proposal.  This cost would be incurred  de- 
spite the availability  of other less expensive  techniques  for controlling 
marine  pollution. 
National  Forest  Policy. The current  timber  policy of the Department 
of Agriculture  has led to a substantial  underutilization  of the national 
forests.  While the department  is required  by law to limit the number  of 
trees  that  can be cut from  these national  forests  to a level no greater  than 
the long-run  sustainable  yield, temporary  increases  could be permitted 
in the cut of mature  trees  without  any  reduction  in the long-run  yield  from 
younger,  faster growing  ones. However, environmental  pressures  have 
succeeded  in preventing  the Forest  Service  from  increasing  the cut in this 
manner.  As a result,  the supply  of timber  from national  forests has not 
grown;  it actually  decreased  by approximately  17 percent  between  1970 
and 1976.28 It is difficult  to estimate  how much  of an increase  in the cut 
from  national  forests  could be both economically  feasible  and consistent 
with the current  timber  policy requiring  a nondeclining  yield. Much of 
the underutilized  timber  is in wilderness  areas  that are expensive  to ex- 
ploit and valuable as environmental  preserves.  If the cut could be in- 
creased  by at least 10 percent  without  violating  the 1976 National  Forest 
Management  Act (and without exceeding  the 1969 cut), the price of 
timber  would decline  by at least 3 percent,  assuming  a demand  elasticity 
of -0.5,  a 1.8 percent  decline  in private  forest output,  and a decrease  in 
net imports  of 0.4 percent.  The impact  would  be to lower  timber  costs by 
approximately  $300 million  annually. 
Passive Restraint Systems for Automobiles.29 In  1977,  the secretary 
of transportation  announced  a decision to require  passive restraint  sys- 
tems  for all front-seat  positions  on all new passenger  cars,  beginning  with 
selected  size classes  in 1981. The decision,  while not as costly as one that 
mandates  air bags, will require  at least passive safety  belts at about $25 
per car more  than  present  belt systems.  Alternatively,  the Department  of 
28. These and the following estimates are drawn from the Council on Wage and 
Price Stability, Lumber Prices and the Lumber Products Industry, Interim Report 
(The Council, October 1977). 
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Transportation  has estimated  the cost of air  bags  to be between  $100 and 
$200 more  than  the present  belt systems.  The total cost of the standard, 
therefore,  is between  $250 million and $2 billion a year.30  This standard 
was adopted  despite evidence that safety belts were the most effective 
safety  devices.  If air bags diminish  seat belt usage, the standard  could 
increase  highway  fatalities. 
"Rolled-in" Pricing of Natural Gas.  The Federal Power Commission 
(now the Federal Energy Regulatory  Commission) has issued initial 
rulings  that imports  of liquid  natural  gas may be rolled  in with gas pur- 
chased  domestically  by pipelines  so that the imported  liquid  natural  gas 
does not reach  final  buyers  at its true incremental  acquisition  price. The 
practical  effect  of this policy in a world  in which  domestic  field  prices  are 
being  regulated  and customers  are allocated  the gas at less than market 
equilibrium  prices  is to transfer  the rents  from domestic  owners  of "old" 
natural  gas to foreign  producers  or their agents.  At present,  it is difficult 
to place a cost on the policy of rolling  in imported  liquid natural  gas at 
prices  as high as $5.27 per thousand  cubic  feet because  the full extent  of 
importation  has not yet been realized;  approximately  5 percent  of natural 
gas  is now  imported.  The potential  cost of this  policy  is equal  to the differ- 
ence between  the full equilibrium  market  value of domestic  gas and the 
regulated  cost of this  gas.3'  This difference  is roughly  $36 billion  per  year, 
or 2.2 percent  of the gross  private  domestic  product  in 1977.32 
Multiple-Point Source Regulation: Guidelines for Iron and Steel Efflu- 
ents. In the absence  of sophisticated  monitoring  techniques,  the Environ- 
mental  Protection  Agency has promulgated  regulations  for both water 
and  air  emissions  based on engineering  performance  standards  for equip- 
ment at each "source"  in an industrial  complex. Because the goal of 
environmental  controls  is to reduce  total emissions  or discharges  per unit 
of time,  it would  seem more  efficient  to specify  emission  levels (or pollu- 
tion taxes) for entire industrial  facilities and even to allow trading  of 
rights  between  different  companies  in the same  area. 
30. This cost would not enter the consumer  price index because the restraint  sys- 
tems are considered  quality improvements  by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  To the 
extent that air bags reduce the severity of accidents, they should reduce insurance 
rates  as well. 
31. The equilibrium  market value of gas is assumed to be equal to  $2.40 per 
thousand  cubic  feet. 
32. Estimate based on data on prices and consumption in U.S. Department of 
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The effect of the Environmental  Protection Agency's detailed ap- 
proach  to regulation  may be illustrated  by the guidelines  for iron and 
steel effluents  proposed  in March  1976. A study  by the Council  on Wage 
and Price Stability  found that the standards  for removal of total sus- 
pended  solids  proposed  for 1983 produced  incremental  costs for meeting 
the  single  standard  that  were  nine  times  as high  for some  parts  of a plant's 
operation  as for other  parts.33  Clearly,  a rational  management,  if allowed 
to minimize  its costs in meeting  an overall standard  for an entire  plant, 
would  not allow  the incremental  costs  to diverge  so widely  across  various 
point sources. The same environmental  cleanliness  could thus be pur- 
chased at much lower costs if the Environmental  Protection Agency 
would  set standards  for an entire  plant  as a unit. 
Mandate for Best-Available-Control Technology in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments  of 1977. In 1977, the Congress  amended  the Clean  Air Act 
in several  ways, one of which was to require  the Environmental  Protec- 
tion Agency to mandate  the "reasonably  best available  control  technol- 
ogy" for emissions  from all new stationary  sources.34  This requirement 
places the emphasis  on the reduction  in pollution, particularly  sulfur, 
rather  than on the level of sulfur emissions.  Hence, it requires  the En- 
vironmental  Protection Agency to mandate the use of scrubbing (or 
another  specific  technology) in combination  with virtually  any type of 
coal. This means  that a utility  no longer  will be given  the choice between 
burning  low-sulfur  coal or scrubbing  the stack  gases from combustion  of 
higher-sulfur  coals. The goal of those proposing  the amendment  was to 
stimulate  the demand  for eastern  and midwestern  coal because  previous 
standards  for new sources  (1.2 lbs of sulfur  per million  Btu) would  lead 
to the importation  of  cheap, low-Btu, low-sulfur coal from western 
mining  regions  to north-central  locations.  The Environmental  Protection 
Agency  has not yet issued  its standards  for new sources  to conform  with 
this requirement,  but it is likely to cost four to eight times as much per 
incremental  ton of sulfur  removed  as the cost in the sulfuric  acid or non- 
ferrous  metals  industries.  The additional  costs may therefore  be between 
$1 billion  and  $2 billion  annually. 
33. See "Effluent  Guidelines and Standards  for Existing and New Sources in the 
Iron and Steel Manufacturing  Point Source Category 40 C.F.R. 420," Comments of 
the  Council on  Wage and  Price Stability before  the  Environmental Protection 
Agency (June 24, 1976; processed). 
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IMPROVING  REGULATION:  A  STRUCTURAL  APPROACH 
The preceding  examples of regulation  illustrate  prospective  policies 
with  potentially  important  impacts  on the price  level. In many  cases,  they 
reflect  political  decisions  of regulators  who have little incentive  to equate 
incremental  social costs to prospective  benefits.  Allowing  or disallowing 
a rate  increase  does not affect a regulator's  budget. Similarly,  the cost- 
effectiveness  of social regulation  is not systematically  measured  by the 
agencies  promulgating  the regulations,  by the Office  of Management  and 
Budget,  or by the Congress.  As a result,  administrators  have little incen- 
tive to spend  their agencies'  scarce  resources  in the pursuit  of economi- 
cally  efficient  regulation.  Invoking  public  health  and safety  is often suffi- 
cient to blunt the thrust  of any critic who claims that the costs are too 
large  for the benefits  derived. 
Faced  with these obvious  problems,  the Ford and Carter  administra- 
tions  have attempted  to require  economic  analysis  from  executive  depart- 
ment  regulatory  agencies.  President  Ford  launched  the "inflation  impact" 
program  in November 1974. Under this program,  each agency within 
the executive  branch  was required  to prepare  an economic assessment 
of the effects of major regulations-generally those with an aggregate 
impact  of $100 million  for one year or $150 million  for two years.  These 
analyses  were  intended  to serve  as a check  on the efficiency  of the regula- 
tions,  but they did not achieve  the planned  result.  Many agencies  virtu- 
ally  ignored  the program,  while  others  perfunctorily  had contractors  per- 
form  the studies.35  These analyses  influenced  agency decisionmaking  in 
only a few cases. Moreover,  they became the source of heated debate 
concerning  the intent of the program.  A congressional  report  suggested 
that  cost-benefit  estimates  required  in such analyses  are counterproduc- 
tive  because  they are  likely  to be biased  and  impossible  to undertake  with 
precision.30 
35. For details of  agency compliance, see the joint evaluation of the inflation 
impact  program  by the Council on Wage and Price Stability and the Office of Man- 
agement  and Budget, "An Evaluation of the Inflation Impact Statement Program," 
prepared  for the Economic Policy Board (December 7, 1976; processed). 
36. Federal  Reguilation  and Regulatory  Reform, Report by the Subcommittee  on 
Oversight  and Investigations of  the House Committee on  Interstate and Foreign 
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In this climate  of congressional  hostility  to the cost-benefit  approach, 
regulators  have not been pressing  the frontiers  of applied  economic  an- 
alysis.  Nevertheless,  the Carter  administration  has announced  a policy of 
requiring  economic impact analyses  from each agency for major deci- 
sions.  Less emphasis  is placed  on the benefit  side of cost-benefit  analysis, 
but the intent  is similar  to that of the inflation-impact  program.  Because 
administrators  of the important  agencies  will continue  to have  little  incen- 
tive to perform  these analyses  well, this policy is not likely to meet the 
goals  set  for it. 
How could government  regulation  of health, safety,  and environment 
be made more efficient  and thus less "inflationary"?  The only approach 
that will work must tie the economic efficiency  of regulations  to the 
agency's  budget constraint.  This could be done either by reversing  the 
ownership of  property rights in  question or  by  developing a  new 
"shadow"  budget  for each agency,  by which it is limited to a specified 
amount  of society's  resources  each year. 
Reversing the Ownership of Property Rights.  The suggestions that pol- 
luters  should be compensated  for reducing  pollution  or paid to increase 
worker  or product  safety are not new ones. Whether  such mechanisms 
could work  has been discussed  at length  by Coase and others.37  As long 
as there  are  multiple  sources  of each externality  in a given  location,  there 
could be a "market"  with a regulatory  agency as buyer-representing 
workers,  residents,  or consumers-and the producers  of the externality 
as sellers.  Presumably  such a market  would  only require  the buyer  to cal- 
culate  the clients'  reservation  price  for the externality  and to submit  a bid 
for it at that price. If, however,  there  were few sellers of the externality 
in a location, the reversal  of property  rights  might not work efficiently 
because  of the  possibility  of monopolistic  control. 
Reversing  property  rights  creates  yet another  problem.  The supply  of 
the offensive  externality  varies  with the ownership  of the property  right. 
If the government  owned  the rights,  for example,  any  new emitter  of pol- 
lution  would have to purchase  those rights  from it at a specified  fee or 
under  specified  conditions  or regulation.  If the ownership  resided with 
owners  or lessees of land adjacent  to the water or air in question,  the 
supply  of the undesired  externality  would become potentially  unlimited. 
37. R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Jozurnal  of Law and Econzomics, 
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Threats to pollute could be increased without limit in order to gain 
revenues  from  the  public  authority. 
A solution  to this  problem  is to pay the polluters  for permanent  reduc- 
tions in their  discharge  rate and use this payment  rate as the tax rate  for 
new sources.  The  partial  reversal  of property  rights  would  mean  that  large 
budget  outlays  would have to be made by the regulatory  authorities  to 
reduce  these  externalities.  Increases  in the price  of pollution  would  mean 
that pollution  from new sources  would be less attractive,  but only at a 
cost to the regulator.  Moreover,  the regulator  would now search  for the 
strategy  with the lowest cost for reducing  the externality  to maximize  his 
achievements  for any  given  budget. 
Use  of Shadow  Budgets. The most  practical  possibility  for confronting 
regulators  with the costs of their  actions  would be to construct  a shadow 
budget  to cover the resources  that the agency  requires  private  agents  to 
consume  in the pursuit  of the regulatory  goal. An agency such as the 
Office  of Management  and Budget  would have to administer  such a sys- 
tem, but Congress  could specify the size of the budgets  for each agency 
or even each program.  Administrators  would not be told how to value 
the benefits  of the dangers  they presumably  would reduce.  Instead,  there 
would be a limitation  on the cost that they could impose on firms  in a 
given  year;  their  function  would  then  be to maximize  the benefits  of their 
regulations  subject to that limitation.  These cost limitations  would be 
publicized  each year  in the budget  message  and would therefore  be more 
visible  to the public, which, in turn,  would be less likely to assume  that 
regulatory  costs are  minimal. 
The administration  of such a system  would not be easy, for someone 
would have to arbitrate  the differences  in the estimates  of costs. These 
estimates  probably  would  be undertaken  by a competent  staff  close to the 
administrator  of each agency  because his total accomplishments  would 
be limited  by the magnitude  of the costs of each regulation.  An inefficient 
choice of regulations  in one area  would reduce  his ability  to promulgate 
regulations  in others.  In addition,  there would be much greater  interest 
in equating  the incremental  costs of controlling  the same externality 
from different  sources. Because these costs are difficult  to estimate ex 
ante, there  should  be provisions  for carrying  back and carrying  forward 
cost limitations  in each budget. Costs could be estimated  ex post, and 
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of the current  year in the case of cost overruns  or added to the budget 
in the case of earlier  overestimates  of costs. A discount  rate could even 
be applied  to such  carryovers. 
FUTURE  PROSPECTS 
No proposal  that fails to alter the incentives  of regulators  will cause 
the protectors  of the environment,  the guardians  of carcinogens,  or the 
preventers  of highway deaths to take economics as seriously as they 
should. Present  incentives,  combined  with imprecise  statutory  language 
about economic efficacy, cause administrators  to be  concerned with 
major,  localized employment  reductions  (often through  plant closings) 
rather  than  with other  economic  effects.  A price  mechanism  or a budget- 
ary process  would change  this system  of incentives  and have potentially 
salutary  effects  on the price  level. 
Foreign  Trade  Restrictions 
A classic example  of government  support  of prices  to redistribute  in- 
come can be found in trade  policy. It allows the government  to protect 
an industry  and its employees  without  direct  budget  outlays.  Protection- 
ism is likely to be sought  and granted  during  periods  of economic  reces- 
sion or declining  comparative  advantage  for individual  industries.  It is 
not surprising,  therefore,  that since 1975 there  have been numerous  new 
protectionist  pleas from industries  such as steel, textiles,  footwear,  elec- 
tronics, copper, and zinc. Many of these pleas have led to successful 
rulings  in cases  presented  before  the International  Trade  Commission. 
The costs and  benefits  of the major  examples  of trade  relief  granted  by 
the commission  or the administration  from 1975 to 1977 are indicated 
in table 11. Each of these actions-tariffs, quotas, or minimum  require- 
ments  for import  prices-generates significant  price effects.  The estimate 
for steel may underestimate  the total effects of trade protection,  given 
the prospects  of further  voluntary  reductions  of exports to the United 
States. The price increase  for sugar is the largest and thus affords  the 
greatest  amount  of protection.  The International  Trade  Commission's  de- 
cisions for footwear  and television  sets have been replaced  by "orderly 
marketing  agreements,"  which may be less severe than the costs of the 
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Table 11. The Effect  of Recent  Extensions  of Trade  Protection,  1975-77 
Annual  total cost of protection 
1977 dollars 
Millions  of 1977 dollars 
Commodity Increase  Increase  Consumer Deadweight 
affected  by  in  jobs  in price  Cost to  Deadweight  cost per  loss per 
extension  (number) (percent) consumers  loss  job gained  job gained 
Sugara  n.a.  28.6  660  56.6  n.a.  n.a. 
Carbon  steela  20,000  3.0  1,254  105.5  62,700  5,275 
Meat  n.a.  2-4  400-800  4.7-18.9  n.a.  n.a. 
Initial  ITC 
recommendationsb 
Television  sets  9,170  20.0  500  116.0  54,526  12,650 
Footwear  21,000  20.0  1,200  75.0  57,143  3,571 
Sources: Based on data in "Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability," submitted to the 
International  Trade Commission, meat investigations TA-201-25 and 332-85 (CWPS-252, July 12, 1977); 
ibid., submitted  to the ITC, television receivers  investigation  TA-201-19 (CWPS-227, January 18, 1977); and 
ibid., testimony  before the ITC, docket TA-201-18  (importation of footwear) (CWPS-217,  December 7, 1976). 
n.a. Not available. 
a.  Author's estimates. 
b. These recommendations  were not implemented in full but were replaced by orderly marketing agree- 
ments, for which the cost estimates are not available. The costs of  the initial  recommendations by the 
International Trade Commission shown in the table are presumably upper limits of  the ultimate costs 
of the agreements. 
tions  are  included  to demonstrate  the degree  of trade  protection  possible. 
The effect  of the orderly  marketing  agreements  cannot  be estimated  with 
data  presently  available.  Excluded  from the table are high tariff  or non- 
tariff  barriers  from  decisions  reached  in earlier  years,  such  as those affect- 
ing textiles,  because  these have been fully accommodated  by the market 
and  are  unlikely  to be eased. 
The cost of trade  protection  is generally  large  in relation  to the increase 
in employment  generated.  In those cases for which data are available 
the average cost to  consumers  for each job protected is more than 
$50,000 a year.  Deadweight  losses are also large,  ranging  up to $12,650 
per additional  job per year. 
If the  intent  of Congress  is to protect  inefficient  U.S. industry,  it is diffi- 
cult to see how the above costs can be reduced  materially.  However,  if 
protection  is seen as a temporary  political response  to the employment 
difficulties  created  for a small number  of workers,  a less inflationary  and 
less  costly  form  of income  support  is available. 
Temporary  subsidies  to labor could be made available  in affected  in- 
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insure that inefficient  U.S. industry  is not perpetuated  unnecessarily. 
Moreover,  the subsidies  must not be in effect so long that they distort 
investment  and production  decisions.  Lowering  the cost of labor for an 
industry  that is losing comparative  advantage  could lead to the creation 
of additional  capacity  and to the substitution  of labor for capital.  These 
effects  would simply  compound  the difficulties  of eventual  adjustment  to 
changes  in comparative  advantage. 
Subsidies  to labor  could be targeted  at those employees  most likely to 
be laid off because of import  competition,  but such identification  is un- 
doubtedly difficult.  Moreover, substitution  would take place between 
subsidized  and unsubsidized  workers.  As a result,  a subsidy  policy would 
probably  have to be general  to the industry.  Assume that Congress  de- 
cided that rehiring  20,000 steelworkers  was desirable  in 1977, and that 
a subsidy  was offered  to steel firms  for all employees.  Given approxi- 
mately 360,000 hourly workers  in the industry,  an annual subsidy of 
more  than $3,750 could be paid for every  employee  in the industry,  and 
the total cost would be no higher  than that of the import  policy of the 
Trade  Act of 1974. This would reduce the hourly cost of labor by ap- 
proximately  14 percent,  which should be sufficient  to induce a 5.6 per- 
cent increase  in employment.  Moreover,  the cost of steel would not be 
raised  by this  form  of assistance. 
Traditional trade assistance is  designed to  ease the transition of 
workers  and firms  to new lines of activity  after import  competition  has 
affected them. Workers  or employers are not provided benefits until 
excess capacity  and unemployment  becomes a reality.  The Trade  Act of 
1974 liberalized  the eligibility  criteria  for adjustment  assistance  and ap- 
peared to recommend  that assistance rather than trade restrictions.38 
Although  trade  adjustment  assistance  for employees  can amount  to as 
much as 70 percent  of forgone  wages, such assistance  generally  offsets 
only a small share of the capital losses suffered  by a firm that has lost 
its market  to imports.  Both employers  and employees  will generally  gain 
more from trade protection  than from assistance.  Thus, the assistance 
allowed under the 1974 Trade Act has not reduced  protectionist  pres- 
sures. 
38. See Charles  R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade  and Domestic Aid (Brookings Insti- 
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The  Minimum  Wage 
The minimum  wage is  an excellent example of  the use of  price- 
enhancing  legislation  to redistribute  income in a manner  that cannot  be 
sustained  politically through direct government  payments. The bene- 
ficiaries  of a legislated  minimum  wage are not principally  the low-wage, 
low-income population,  but a number  of groups who compete in the 
labor  market  with  these  less fortunate  workers. 
At the beginning  of the Carter  administration,  the AFL-CIO  launched 
a major  effort  to increase  the minimum  wage from $2.30 an hour, which 
was established  for 1976 as a result  of the Fair  Labor  Standards  Amend- 
ments  of 1974. The minimum  wage  level, which  had averaged  52 percent 
of straight-time  (nonovertime)  hourly earnings  in manufacturing  in the 
last half of the 1960s, had fallen  to 44 percent  of this benchmark  by Jan- 
uary 1977. There were proposals  to increase  it gradually  by indexing  it 
to the average  manufacturing  wage. Alternatively,  one proposal given 
serious consideration  (the Dent bill) would have raised the minimum 
wage to 60 percent  of the manufacturing  wage by January  1978. 
The final  legislation,  the Fair Labor  Standards  Amendments  of 1977, 
which became effective  in November,  raised the minimum  to $2.65 an 
hour in January  1978, $2.90 in January  1979, $3.10 in January  1980, 
and $3.35 in January  1981. This replaced  a Senate  proposal  to index the 
wage to 52 percent  of the straight-time  average  hourly earnings  of pro- 
duction workers  in manufacturing  in January  1979 and 53 percent in 
January  1980.39 At the time  of passage,  these  percentages  were  projected 
to yield minimum  wages equal to those finally  legislated.  Thus, the final 
Senate and House agreement  merely replaced  the indexation  approach 
with  equivalent  projected  wages.40 
None of the innovative  suggestions  designed  to reduce  the impact  of 
the minimum  wage on the emploability  of low-income teen-agers  was 
39. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, S. Rept. 95-440, 95:1  (GPO, 
1977). 
40.  There are a few other minor changes in the minimum wage. The tip credit 
is being reduced gradually from 50 percent to 40 percent. The exemption for small 
retail and service establishments  is being gradually liberalized. The act also intro- 
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adopted.  The Senate  report  argues  that there are no employment  effects. 
Economic  studies  generally  show  just the opposite-that increases  in the 
minimum  wage result in unemployment  for low-wage  workers.  Edward 
Gramlich  shows  that these effects  may not be large and, with unemploy- 
ment  insurance,  may  not reduce  the welfare  of low-wage  adult  workers.4' 
But minimum  wages  have a most  undesirable  effect  on teen-agers,  shifting 
employment  from  full-time  to part-time  work. 
To estimate  the price  effects  of the increased  minimum  wage,  I employ 
Gramlich's  result-that each 1 percent  increase  in the minimum  wage  in- 
creases  average  wages  by 0.032 percent.  The first-year  increase  to $2.65 
an hour is a 15.2 percent  rise, which should increase  average  wages in 
1978 by 0.5 percent.  This will produce  an estimated  increase  in total pri- 
vate wages and salaries  of approximately  $3 billion. 
If the purpose  of enacting  a minimum  wage is to increase  the income 
of low-wage  workers,  more  efficient  strategies  could  be found  that  would 
not adversely  affect  the price level or employment.  A wage subsidy  pro- 
gram,  such as the one announced  by the administration  in its urban  pro- 
gram,  could  be paid to those  firms  employing  workers  from  certified  low- 
income  families.  This would  target  the program  at the desired  population 
rather  than raise  the wage for teen-agers  from high-income  families  who 
may be working  in jobs near the minimum  wage level. The only major 
drawback  to such a program  may  be its tendency  to induce  employers  to 
substitute  eligible  potential  workers  for existing  workers,  some of whom 
may only be marginally  above the poverty level. But such a program 
financed  from general revenues would have avoided increasing  labor 
costs by $3 billion in 1978. 
Other  Policy  Initiatives 
The government  could also undertake  a number  of other  initiatives,  a 
few of which are summarized  in this section. Some proposals,  such as 
hospital cost control, might have significant  effects on the price level; 
others,  such as pursuing  a more aggressive  antitrust  policy, are likely to 
have  less impact. 
41.  Edward M. Gramlich, "Impact of  Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Em- 
ployment,  and Family Incomes,"  BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 409-51. Robert  W.  Crandall  435 
HOSPITAL  COST  CONTROL 
Hospital  cost containment,  a regulatory  policy designed  to have salu- 
tary  effects  on the price  level, was advocated  by the Carter  administration 
in 1977, but it has failed to win the support  of the Congress.  Because  of 
the tax deductibility  of health insurance,  the lack of coinsurance  and 
deductibility  provisions  in insurance  payment  policies, and the absence 
of market  competition  among  hospitals,  there  is little market  discipline  in 
the provision  of hospital  services.  Without  any restraining  forces, expen- 
ditures  for hospital care have recently  been rising at an annual  rate of 
about 15 percent  a year. A hospital  cost-containment  policy limiting  the 
rate  of growth  in hospital  revenues  to the rate  of increase  in the gross  na- 
tional product  deflator  plus one-third  the difference  between  the recent 
average  annual  rate of growth  in hospital  expenditures  and the GNP de- 
flator  (approximately  3 percent) would  have reduced  the growth  in hos- 
pital expenditures  by 2.6 percent if it had begun in fiscal year 1978. 
Assuming  that 80 percent  of the reduction  would be reflected  as price 
changes,  the net saving would be 2.1 percent of $72 billion, or $1.5 
billion (in fiscal  year 1978 dollars). 
RESTRAINT  IN  FEDERAL  PAY  INCREASES 
A large  budget  item for the federal  government  is its nondefense  pay- 
roll-approximately $22.5 billion  in 1977. These  wages  do not, however, 
enter directly  into costs and prices;  hence, reducing  them or restraining 
the government's  annual  cost-of-living  increases  will not directly  reduce 
the private  deflator  or the consumer  price index. A reduction  in the in- 
crease  to be granted  this  year  could,  however,  have some  impact  on wages 
in the private  sector  through  its effect  on wage  demands  and  offers  in skill 
markets  in which  government  workers  participate.  (Moreover,  any  policy 
to limit these increases could provide a salutary example of broader 
wage-price  policies.) The magnitude  of this impact  on wages in the pri- 
vate sector  cannot  be determined  in a paper  of this scope. 
One suggestion  offered  to the President  is that he reduce  the annual 
increase  by 0.5 to 1.0 percentage  point from  the target  submitted  to him 
based on "comparability"  with the private  sector. This reduction  might 
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13 to 20 percent  more than their counterparts  in the private sector.42 
Based on the 1977 level of federal compensation  of nondefense em- 
ployees,  the saving  from  such a cut would  be in the range  of $112 million 
to $225 million  annually. 
AGGRESSIVE  ANTITRUST  POLICY 
A common  view of inflation  in the past few years  has been that  mone- 
tary  and  fiscal  authorities  are unwilling  to hold nominal  GNP to a steady 
growth  rate in the face of sharp  increases  in oil, agricultural,  or other 
commodity  prices. Instead, they have been accommodating,  allowing 
nominal  GNP to rise as a result  of these disruptive  changes.  Forcing  other 
prices  and wages  downward  through  restrictive  monetary  and fiscal  poli- 
cies generates  huge welfare  losses in the form of unemployed  resources, 
which  occur  because  of the general  inflexibility  of these other  wages and 
prices.  The transitional  costs of this unemployment  are too much for a 
politically  responsive  administration  to bear. 
But if it is this  inflexibility  of wages  and  prices  that  so limits  traditional 
policy tools, could some structural  remedies be provided to increase 
price-wage  flexibility?  There  are  several  reasons  why the answer  to such  a 
question  is decidedly  negative. 
First, the empirical  evidence  on the effects  of concentration  on price 
flexibility  is at best mixed.43  While  there  is some evidence  that prices  re- 
spond more slowly to changes in demand  in moderately  concentrated 
industries  than  in atomistic  or highly  concentrated  industries,  this pattern 
has not been consistent  over successive  business  cycles. 
Equally important  is the sectoral structure  of the U.S. economy. In 
1976, more than one-fourth  of all national  income  originated  in govern- 
ment  and  regulated  industries.4  While  some  of these  latter  industries  may 
42.  Sharon P. Smith, Equal Pay in the Public Sector: Fact or Fantasy (Prince- 
ton University,  Industrial  Relations Section, 1977), p. 132. 
43.  See Ralph E. Beals, "Concentrated  Industries,  Administered  Prices and Infla- 
tion: A Survey of Recent Empirical Research"  (Council on Wage and Price Stabil- 
ity, 1975; processed); and Phillip Cagan, "Changes in the Recession Behavior of 
Wholesale Prices in the 1920's and Post-World  War II," Explorations in Economic 
Research,  vol. 2 (Winter 1975), pp. 54-104. 
44. Estimates  of the sectoral structure  are based on national income without capi- 
tal consumption adjustment  by industry. Survey of Current  Business, vol. 57 (July 
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become  more competitive  over the next few years (stock brokerage  and 
air  transportation),  there  is little chance  that  much  of this 26 percent  will 
move to a nonregulated,  competitive  category  with flexible wages and 
prices.  Moreover,  a good deal  of mining  and  manufacturing-particularly 
the energy  industries-may become  less competitive  as government  regu- 
lation  continues  to supplant  market  forces. 
Of the remaining  74 percent  of national  income,  roughly  44 percent  is 
currently  derived  from  basically  competitive  sectors:  wholesale  and  retail 
trade, most services, agriculture,  and construction.  There are concen- 
trated  industries  within  these categories,  although  competitive  reform  is 
unlikely  to occur  there. 
Serious attempts  to increase competition  could possibly succeed in 
mining  and manufacturing,  which comprise  only 27.5 percent of total 
national  income. Manufacturing  is already  rather  unconcentrated:  only 
1.8 percent of value added in manufacturing  is found in industries  in 
which  the four-firm  concentration  ratio exceeds 67 percent.  Another 18 
percent  derives  from  industries  with concentration  ratios  between  50 and 
66 percent.  Antitrust  policy aimed  at less-concentrated  industries  would 
be exceedingly  difficult  to implement  and might  be counterproductive  if 
the resulting  firms  were operating  below their  most efficient  output  level. 
A Summary  of Policy  Proposals 
As this paper has shown, a number  of proposed policies could be 
launched  as part  of the effort  to reduce  the price  level, while  pursuing  the 
search  for the appropriate  longer-run  policy to control inflation.  Given 
the heterogeneous  nature  of the proposals  offered,  it is difficult  to sum- 
marize  them  neatly  or concisely.  Some cannot  be quantified  on the basis 
of present  evidence  and within  the scope of this paper.  Others  could be 
modified  in a number  of ways to satisfy other policy goals and at the 
same  time  could  have  some  beneficial  effects  on the price  level.  The effects 
of some prospective  policies  that can be quantified  are tabulated  in table 
12. 
Clearly,  the largest  potential  effects-assuming the difference  in inci- 
dence between  direct  and indirect  taxation-are  to be found in altering 
social security  and sales taxation. The substitution  of direct taxes for 
indirect  state taxes could produce a 1.6 percent decline in the private 438  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1978 
Table  12. Summary  of Policy Proposals  to Reduce  the Price Level 
Potential  reduction 
In gross  private 
Annual  amount  domestic  deflator 
Proposal  (billions  of 1977 dollars)  (percent) 
Social security 
Replace  employer  and employee  payroll  14.6  0. 7% 
taxes with general  revenue  financing  for 
disability  and health  insurance  (fiscal  1979) 
Sales taxes 
Reduce state sales taxes up to 2  27.4  1.6 
percentage  points of personal  income 
Replace federal  excise taxes with direct  taxes  17.4  1.0 
Agriculture 
Substitute  deficiency  payments  for 1977-78  3.6  0.2 
wheat,  feed  grain,  soybean,  milk initiatives 
Substitute  deficiency  payments  for set-aside  4.4  0.3 
proposals  designed  to raise farm income 
by $4.4 billionb 
Government  regulation 
Pursue  deregulation  of airlines,  trucking,  and  5. 3 to 10.4  0.3  to 0.6 
the coastal maritime  trade 
Impose a shadow budget  on social regu-  Unmeasurable  with  ... 
latory agencies  present  data 
Increase  federal  timber  cut  0.3  0.02 
Require  fully incremental  costing of all  Unknown, but up to  Up to 2.2 
imported  liquid and synthetic  natural  36.0 
gas 
Reassess  best-available-control-technology  1.0 to 2.0  0.06 to 0. 12 
amendment  to Clean Air Act 
Foreign  trade 
Substitute  direct  subsidies  for meat, steel,  2.3 to 2.7  0. 1 to 0.2 
and sugar  import  restraints 
Minimum  wage 
Replace 1978 minimum-wage  increase  3.1  0.2 
with employment  incentives 
Hospital  cost control 
Impose  limited  cost controls (fiscal 1978)  1.5  0.09 
Source: Compiled from information in the text. 
a. Based on projection of fiscal 1979 gross domestic private product. 
b. This is approximately the effect of  some agricultural legislation being considered in the Congress 
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domestic  deflator.  General  revenue  financing  of disability  insurance  and 
health  insurance  funding  in social security  could lead to another  0.7 per- 
cent  decline  in fiscal  1979. 
The remaining  policy initiatives  are perhaps  less important  in terms 
of their  prospective  effects  on the price  level, but each  one is to be strongly 
recommended  on grounds  of economic  efficiency  and  internal  consistency 
between  stated  policy  goals and  their  attainment.  For instance,  changes  in 
agricultural  policy that  would  stress  income  supports  instead  of price  sup- 
ports could reduce  the private  deflator  by a total of 0.2 percent (for the 
1977-78 changes  in agricultural  policy), but such changes  would also 
allow  market  forces  to allocate  agricultural  resources  far more  efficiently. 
Avoiding  the price  increases  in proposals  now before  the Congress  would 
prevent  another  0.3 percent  rise in the deflator. 
A reform  of the basic constraints  on regulatory  agencies  might  have 
relatively  minor effects  on the price level (while increasing  the benefits 
from reducing  undesirable  externalities),  but it would improve  the effi- 
ciency  of regulators  in mandating  the flow of scarce  resources  for social 
purposes.  Reform  of transportation  could lower  the private  domestic  de- 
flator  by as much as 0.6 percent (without calculating  any effect upon 
railroad  rates), and it would clearly  reduce  economic  waste in this vital 
sector  of the economy. 
Minor changes  such as increasing  the timber  cut on federal  lands or 
instructing  the Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission  to pursue  incre- 
mental pricing of synthetic  natural  gas or imported  liquid natural  gas 
would  have  relatively  immediate  effects  upon  the price  level, but  the latter 
policy could have much greater  long-term  benefits.  Similarly,  hospital 
cost control  would  not have a major  impact  on the price  level, compared 
with other  initiatives,  but it would  reduce  the excessive  flow of resources 
to a sector  that  is not governed  by usual  market  forces. 
A change  from protectionism  to adjustment  assistance  has been pre- 
scribed  elsewhere.  A reversal  of the recent  extensions  of protection  would 
have relatively  small effects on the price level, but if older restraints 
(such as those applying  to textiles  and clothing) were  replaced,  the effect 
could be much greater.  And the efficiency  gains would be large if trade 
protection  were removed in favor of easing the burden on displaced 
workers  and  capital. 
Finally,  the increases  in the minimum  wage  legislated  in 1977 could  be 
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tribute  labor  incomes.  The effects  on the price  level of this change  would 
be substantial  as would the prospective  effects  on employment  of teen- 
agers. 
None of these proposals  solves the inflation  problem,  but a combina- 
tion of a number  of them might  reduce  the rate of increase  in the price 
level for some time. They may be especially  useful as part of a broader 
program  aimed at wage-price  moderation.  Even if the effect of these 
initiatives  on inflation  proves  to be minor  or short-lived,  most  would  have 
salutary  effects on economic efficiency.  The increase in gross national 
product  should certainly  be greater  than the administrative  and transi- 
tional  costs required  to put these reforms  into effect. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Edward  M. Gramlich:  Robert  Crandall  has written  a most useful species 
of what  in government  parlance  might  be called an options  paper.  He re- 
views  a wide variety  of actions  the government  could  take  to reduce  price 
levels-many  of these in fact reversing  actions  already  taken  to increase 
price levels-and  provides  the benefits  and costs of these suggested  ac- 
tions and their effect on overall prices. In general,  most of the actions 
appear  to be attractive  for their  efficiency  gains as well as for their  infla- 
tion-reducing  impact. 
Because  inflation  is the subject  of the conference,  I begin  by comment- 
ing on the relationship  between  one-shot  reductions  in the price  level and 
inflation  reductions.  Assume  the two-equation  mainline  model of back- 
ward-looking  inflation  (similar  to the model  in George  Perry's  paper  and 
also  used  by  Arthur  Okun): 
AP  AW 
AW  /MP\  AW\ 
-W =  ao +  a,  V  1 +  a2  V  w) 
where  P refers  to prices and W to wages. The parameter  a, depends  on 
unemployment,  other proxies for demand,  or both, and perhaps  it also 
depends  on whether  a tax-based  incomes  policy exists. I assume  that ao 
(and implicitly  unemployment)  is fixed because I am not considering 
demand: in particular,  this implies that the one-shot increase in real 
money  that follows any one-shot  reduction  in price levels is neutralized. 
The parameters  a, and a2 divide backward-looking  inflation  into price- 
wage and wage-wage  components,  and may either sum to one (if the 
model were accelerationist)  or not. Most of the policies Crandall  de- 
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scribes  can be viewed as one-shot, nonmaintained  increases  in the shift 
parameter  b. 
It can be shown  that if the model were accelerationist  (al + a2  =  1), 
the permanent  impact  on the rate  of inflation  of a unit change  in b would 
be al, the price-wage  feedback  component  of the accelerationist  model. 
If the model were not accelerationist  (a, + a2 <  1), there would be no 
permanent  reduction  in the rate of inflation,  although  for any path of 
real output,  inflation  will be slower for a number  of periods, with the 
amount  of slowdown  declining  in each period.  If the model  were  forward 
looking,  it is doubtful  that  there  would  be any  price  effect  on wages.  And 
there  would  be none if inertia  were  entirely  a wage-wage  process.  Hence, 
it takes a rather  particular  view of inflation  to translate  one-shot price 
level reductions  into significant  permanent  inflation  reductions-it has to 
be accelerationist,  backward  looking, and primarily  a price-wage  type 
all at the same time. While many empirical  models actually have this 
form,  as Perry's  paper  indicated,  that  may  be because  with  real  world  data 
it is difficult  to draw  a fine distinction  between  this form and others.  But 
many  people would question  the applicability  of this model of inflation 
in the case of one-shot,  nonrecurring  changes  in price  levels. If that  is the 
case, the inflation-reducing  potential  of the measures  Crandall  discusses 
could be quite modest, although  some of the measures  may still be an 
important  part  of a whole package  geared  to alter  near-term  inflationary 
expectations  in the  United  States  in 1978. 
My biggest surprise  concerning  the measures  was the low potential 
given to antitrust  policy. This results  primarily  from simple multiplica- 
tion-only  27.5 percent  of national  income  is generated  in the relatively 
concentrated  unregulated  manufacturing  and  mining  sectors,  and  less than 
20 percent of that portion is concentrated.  Moreover,  after a possible 
one-shot  reduction  in price levels, all that could be expected  from anti- 
trust  policy would be an increase  in price flexibility,  and this would be 
anti-inflationary  on balance  only when the unemployment  rate averaged 
above the nonaccelerating  rate of unemployment.  Hence, apart from 
the subtleties  that Crandall  does not discuss-price leadership  reactions 
and the fact that pass-through  may not be dollar-for-dollar  but may be 
disproportionately  influenced  by industries  early  in the production  chain 
-there  seems  to be relatively  little  possibility  of gain. 
The most promising  measure  Crandall  considers  is the reduction  of 
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of social  security  through  general  revenues.  If done  completely,  this  would 
reduce employer  contributions  by $14.6 billion in fiscal 1979 and, if 
shifted  forward  completely,  it would  lower  price  levels by as much  as 0.7 
percent.  Whether  the price  reduction  is this large  or not, and the inflation 
reduction  is permanent  or temporary,  such a measure  clearly  seems  desir- 
able  on grounds  of both  economic  efficiency  and  distributional  equity. 
The other potentially significant  action, at least in dollar terms, is 
Okun's  proposal  for a general  sales tax reduction.  This one is not as ap- 
pealing  once Crandall  holds it up to close inspection.  There  is not much 
scope  for reducing  federal  excise  taxes;  the only important  one remaining 
that  is not justified  by an obvious social externality  is the telephone  ex- 
cise. There  is no obvious reason  why this should not be cut, but it will 
not amount  to much in dollar  terms.  The bigger  game is for state sales 
taxes: when, say, state  sales taxes up to 2 percent  of personal  income  are 
replaced  with a combination  of federal  and state and local income  taxes, 
price levels would be reduced  as much as 1.6 percent  or $27 billion in 
1977. Crandall  divides  the replacement  equally  between  the state  and  the 
federal  income tax, but I believe the present state preference  for sales 
taxes would be less strong  than this implies,  and the federal  government 
should  be able to accomplish  its end with a grant  of less than $13 billion. 
The calculation  can  be made  even  more  attractive:  because  sales  tax rates 
are  rising  over time, if a reduced  rate  had to be maintained,  the effect  on 
price levels would grow through  time. But there is a fundamental  and 
important  problem  with the measure  that goes back to the difference  be- 
tween levels and rates of price changes: presumably  to gain this rev- 
enue shift, the federal  government  would have to make continuing  grant 
payments.  Assuming only a modest permanent  reduction in inflation 
rates  from  this policy, in 1982 the federal  government  would still be pay- 
ing for a temporary  reduction  in the price level of 1978, while realizing 
little change in the 1982 inflation  rate. The federal government  could 
always  stop payment,  but then what is to prevent states from restoring 
their  sales  tax?  Is the federal  government,  after  stopping  payments,  going 
to sue states  that got money  back in 1978 but now in 1982 let sales tax 
rates  rise again?  If so, the government  will have to write it into the law 
now, and then I think the odds that states  will accept  the grant  and this 
future  constraint  on their  fiscal  policies are drastically  reduced. 
Finally,  I would like to comment  on the proposals  Crandall  considers 
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is a structural  imbalance  in the process  for making  these  decisions:  unlike 
most other  programs  where  the cost is an observed  budget  cost and the 
antagonist  is the Office  of Management  and Budget,  social and environ- 
mental  regulations  impose unobserved  social costs with no natural  an- 
tagonists.  Something  should be done at least to factor these social costs 
into the decisionmaking  process,  but exactly  what  is unclear. 
Crandall  reviews  two options,  one of which  I do not like and one I do. 
These options are reversing  property  rights, or making  the government 
buy nonpollution  from  polluters,  and  providing  regulators  with a shadow 
budget.  Crandall  rejects  the first  as politically  impossible.  I would  reject  it 
as just plain wrong. To keep government  costs down it is necessary  to 
adopt an approach  such as buying  nonpollution  only from current-day 
polluters;  otherwise,  anybody  could  say  that  they  were  intending  to pollute 
and  receive  a payment  for not doing so. Even this limited  scheme  has the 
disadvantage  of rewarding  those who behave in a socially undesirable 
manner.  However, the second option-allowing  an agency such as the 
Office  of Management  and  Budget  (OMB) to monitor  social costs as well 
as budget  costs-seems  to me to be a great idea. A potential  argument 
against  it is that social costs are more difficult  to estimate  than budget 
costs;  but it is not obvious  that this is true  or relevant.  Costs of new pro- 
grams  (such as Medicaid  and the C5A plane) are always  difficult  to esti- 
mate, and  benefits  cause  even more  problems.  But if it is a budget  expen- 
diture,  people tend to plunge  ahead  anyway,  making  decisions  as well as 
they can. I see no underlying  efficiency  or equity  differences  between  the 
average  social expenditure  program  and the average social regulation 
program:  in both cases, benefits  are possibly  important  but often vague 
and  unmeasurable,  and costs can be stated  in terms  of resources  given  up 
-whether  these resources  are taxed away  or are required  to be spent on 
safety or antipollution.  And in both cases, OMB might be the natural 
watchdog.  Why not simply  broaden  the charter  of OMB, have it ask all 
agencies  for an estimate  of the nonbudget  costs of their regulatory  ac- 
tions, and then let the expanded  budget  process  work  as the regular  pro- 
cess does  now?  This  will not constrain  new regulation  programs  any  more 
than it now limits new budget  programs.  If the benefits  of a regulation 
program  are substantial  and the costs minimal,  the program  ought to be 
successful.  But the new procedure  could alter a decision process that 
now ignores  the social costs of regulation  programs,  national  health in- 
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Robert  E. Hall: Crandall's  paper  provides  an opportunity  to discuss  the 
effectiveness  of policies to reduce the consumer  price index by shifting 
government  finance  from indirect  to the direct  taxation  of income. The 
paper  is written  as if this were  desirable  on the grounds  that it would  give 
a temporary  respite  from inflation.  I think that most participants  at this 
meeting  agree. 
I find the argument  for moving  toward  more taxation  of income less 
convincing.  It seems  to me that the argument  rests on an illusion created 
by the conventions  of the CPI, which includes excise taxes and govern- 
ment-mandated  high prices, but does not measure  the adverse  effect of 
income taxes. Consider an alternative:  a comprehensive  cost-of-living 
index, which is defined  as the amount  of income needed  before taxes to 
purchase  the standard  market  basket of goods now used to define the 
CPI. In my view, this is the index that  people should  be concerned  about 
in discussing  the cost  of living  and  the  rate  of inflation. 
What  happens  when one of Crandall's  reforms  is instituted,  and sub- 
sequently  prices fall and the income tax is raised to provide the same 
amount  of subsidy?  Note that it is necessary  to abstract  from a large 
amount  of advocacy  of simple  government  economy  that appears  in the 
paper.  The introduction  of the reform  policy would achieve  no economy; 
rather,  it would  result  in a shift  from  higher  prices  to higher  income  taxes. 
The official CPI would fall, and initially  people might think they had 
higher  real  incomes.  But the comprehensive  index  would  agree  with com- 
mon sense: real incomes  would  be unaffected  by the change,  at least to a 
first  approximation.  The notion  that  the  policy  would  be deflationary  is no 
more  than  an illusion  of the CPI. Real incomes  can rise only if the policy 
eliminates  deadweight  loss. This is the efficiency  issue that Crandall  does 
not discuss. 
But there  is more to the story  because  the objective  of the shift to in- 
come taxation  was to intervene  in the inflationary  process, not just to 
raise real incomes. Suppose,  first, that various  initiatives  that Crandall 
discussed  were adopted  and that there  were no other responses  of mon- 
etary  and  fiscal  instruments  beyond  the increase  in income  taxes that  was 
part of the initiatives.  The public's  total dollar income  would fall due to 
the increase  in income  taxes, and the volume  of expenditures  would also 
fall because of the reduction  in prices. Money demand would conse- 
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demand  in the money  market.  This  is the basic logic of the argument  that 
changes  from  higher  prices  to higher  income  taxes are expansionary,  and 
I find it persuasive.  It implies that money demand  is not raised by the 
increase  in income tax collections;  rather, this demand is lowered by 
changing  the  composition  of consumers'  disbursements. 
As I mentioned  above, the comprehensive  cost-of-living  index would 
not record  any significant  change as a result of the reform  policy. The 
macroeconomic  effect  of a policy that reduced  prices  by 1 percent  while 
holding  the comprehensive  index constant  would be the same as that of 
an increase  in the money  supply  of 1 percent  with  prices  held constant.  If 
the  monetary  expansion  is undesirable  because  it eventually  would  worsen 
inflation,  the policy  of reduced  prices  and  increased  income  taxes  is unde- 
sirable  on the same  grounds.  The smokescreen  of the reduction  in the CPI 
would  conceal  a move  that  was  actually  inflationary. 
Advocates  of the strategy  of lowering  prices and raising  income taxes 
are  not satisfied  with  the amount  of expansion  that  naturally  accompanies 
the policy. They propose  to take advantage  of the temporary  lowering  of 
the rate of inflation  as recorded  by the CPI to expand  the economy  even 
more. But, again,  this rests on the CPI illusion. The rate of inflation  as 
measured  by the comprehensive  cost-of-living  index would not fall when 
the policy  was introduced,  and  would  rise  subsequently  in response  to the 
expansion. 
I have overstated  the case against  this kind of policy by neglecting  two 
important  points. First, economists  still lack a good explanation  of why 
inflation  is bad. The inflation  I described  that would be measured  by the 
comprehensive  cost-of-living  index would be accompanied  by an equal 
inflation  in wage  rates,  and  would  leave real incomes  unaffected.  Because 
it is not known  why any  kind  of inflation  is bad, it is difficult  to argue  that 
one index is better  than another  as a measure  of inflation.  It is possible 
that the only costs of inflation  are psychological,  and those costs will be 
attached  to whatever  price index the government  decides to publish.  In 
that case, an index  like the CPI that admits  a "gimmick"  for a temporary 
reduction  in reported  inflation  is actually  superior  to the comprehensive 
index that reveals  that a policy is no more than a gimmick.  Then Cran- 
dall's  policies  become  games  that  the government  plays  with  the populace, 
although  as Arthur  Okun constantly  reminds  us, there are games  where 
the  prizes  are  measured  in tens  of billions  of dollars. 
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flaws  because  labor  contracts  are often indexed  to it. Any policy that  de- 
presses  the CPI limits the wage increases  paid to workers  with cost-of- 
living  escalators.  This kind of policy offers  the potential  of slowing  down 
the momentum  of inflation,  but at the cost of some inequity  in wage re- 
wards.  Those who adopt cost-of-living  escalators  rely on the CPI as the 
best available  measure  of the cost of living, and may feel cheated  if the 
government  introduces  a new policy that deliberately  lowers the CPI 
without  affecting  that  cost. 
Much  of Crandall's  paper  discusses  policies  that are  not mere  substitu- 
tions of direct taxes for indirect  taxes. In fact, many of those policies 
eliminate  deadweight  losses now created  by the government  and so offer 
genuine  reductions  in inflation  and increases  in real incomes.  Policies of 
this  kind  include  deregulation  of transportation,  reform  of national  forest 
management,  improved  pricing of natural  gas, and elimination  of the 
minimum  wage.  In other  cases  it is unclear  how much  of the price  reduc- 
tion represents  elimination  of deadweight  loss. Rolling back regulations 
of the Occupational  Safety  and Health  Administration,  auto safety  regu- 
lations, and so on would reduce the prices of the products directly 
affected,  but there  may  be an offsetting  loss of the more  general  benefits  of 
these programs  that ought to be considered  in any true measure  of the 
cost of living. 
Nevertheless,  Crandall  makes a good case that there is much dead- 
weight  loss in these programs  as they are now administered.  Unhappily, 
though,  the policies whose quantitative  potentials  are the largest  are also 
those that are almost  pure substitutions  of one tax for another,  and can 
only be called  gimmicks.  Examples  of these are the replacement  of social 
security  payroll taxes with income taxes, and the substitution  of direct 
taxes for state general sales taxes. Besides the distributional  argument 
in favor  of the former,  all policies are justified  only by the desirability  of 
lowering  prices without affecting  the comprehensive  cost of living. The 
various  policies suggested  sum to a total reduction  of about 4.9 percent 
in the price  level-including deregulation,  which  would  yield a reductioll 
of 0.5 percent,  and  neglecting  the two policies  in table 12 that  do not carry 
estimates  and incremental  costing of natural  gas. Of this, 3.3 percent 
derives  from  pure  tax substitutions,  and  no claim  is made  that  any  increase 
in real  incomes  would  follow  from  them. 
There  is a danger  of placing  too much  weight  on the effects  of various 
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with an "inflation  impact statement."  Some desirable  moves are highly 
inflationary-today, any sensible energy policy, either the President's 
or a more  free-market  one, is bound  to raise  the price level, but it is still 
a good  idea. Bad  policies  like subsidies  for the railroad  industry  may  gain 
support  from  their  depressing  effect  on the price  level. In some countries, 
the adoption  of policies mainly on the strength  of their effects on the 
cost-of-living  index has gone to absurd  lengths.  It would be undesirable 
for  the  United  States  to start  in that  direction. 
Robert Crandall:  Both Gramlich and Hall question whether policies 
directed  toward  lowering  the price  level in discrete  steps  could  reduce  the 
rate  of inflation,  but  nothing  in my paper  suggests  that  these  policies,  once 
promulgated,  would necessarily  reduce  the subsequent  upward  march  of 
prices and wages. Indeed, I am as agnostic on the issue as Hall and 
Gramlich.  Perry's  paper  does not rule  out a price-wage  effect,  but  whether 
it is large  enough  to permit  an anti-inflationary  dynamic  to be introduced 
by discrete  government-induced  reductions  of the price level remains  an 
open  question. 
I am somewhat  puzzled  by Hall's focus on the distinction  between a 
true cost-of-living  indicator  and the consumer  price index. My paper 
attempted  to demonstrate  the possibilities  for reducing  the price level- 
which  could  be defined  as one or another  of the indexes  of market  prices. 
It did not suggest  that reductions  in the price level, per se, increase  real 
income.  Nor is the exercise  in the spirit  of promoting  deception  as a gov- 
ernment  policy. Any policy that attempts  to intervene  in the inflationary 
process  will probably  affect  someone's  real income.  Whether  substituting 
direct  for indirect  taxes is more  unfair  than reducing  the rate of growth 
of the money  supply  is not a question  that  I pretend  to answer. 
It is true,  as Gramlich  believes,  that  the efficiency  gains  for  various  poli- 
cies would be a worthwhile  basis for advocating  them even if they have 
no lasting  anti-inflationary  effect.  Unfortunately,  as Hall notes,  the largest 
efficiency  gains  exist in those proposals  with the more modest  price-level 
effects.  However,  it should  be noted  that  I have only scratched  the surface 
in detailing  initiatives  that  would  undo  the misallocative  effects  of existing 
government  policy. This choice was deliberate  because  I was interested 
in focusing  on policy choices  that  are  relevant  in today's  political  climate. 
Thus, for instance,  I examined  import restrictions  on sugar and steel 
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programs  for wheat,  cotton, and feed grain  while ignoring  the myriad  of 
market-order  programs  that keep the U.S. Department  of Agriculture 
busy. 
There  seems to be some confusion  about  my proposals  for reform  of 
social regulation.  First, Hall sees them as attempts  to roll back some 
regulatory  programs  that have social value. While I am sure that there 
are instances  in which "rolling  back"  may be appropriate,  this is not my 
objective.  It is only to seek some mechanism  by which regulators  can be 
made  to realize  that  they are  mandating  the use of scarce  resources  when 
they pursue  their  various  social goals. Gramlich's  questioning  of my pro- 
posal to reverse property  rights in some instances  suggests some mis- 
understanding  of my proposal.  I would  only use this  mechanism  for exist- 
ing sources  of externalities,  and  the price  paid  by the government  to these 
sources  for ceasing  their  damaging  activity  would  become  the tax paid by 
new sources  to the government  for originating  new social changes.  While 
I think that such a proposal  is theoretically  sound, I am not optimistic 
that it could be explained  to the public. 
General  Discussion 
Part  of the discussion  focused  on the anti-inflationary  effectiveness  and 
potential of the general strategy  of reducing  the cost and price level. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  took issue  with  Robert  Hall's emphasis  on the "com- 
prehensive"  cost-of-living  index. He interpreted  Hall's index as a mea- 
sure of the purchasing  power of income, but he also saw reasons to 
measure  the purchasing  power  of money  as the consumer  price  index  did. 
He noted that a reduction  in the CPI could have important  economic 
effects,  even if it were not accompanied  by a reduction  in Hall's type of 
index. So long as anti-inflationary  monetary  policy was influenced  by 
monetary  growth  targets,  a lower inflation  rate of the CPI would lead to 
a greater  expansion  of real  output.  Franco  Modigliani,  however,  qualified 
that conclusion,  pointing  out that it was true  if money  demand  depended 
on gross national product, rather than on gross national income-an 
issue that he considered  unsettled.  William Brainard  supported  Dorn- 
busch's  general  point that the CPI mattered,  pointing  to its role in labor 
negotiations  and other economic  decisions.  He saw a case for changing 
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ing payments  to foreigners  (that is, rising  import  prices) or higher  costs 
due to increased  collective  consumption  (that is, improved  environmen- 
tal standards).  But he noted that such an issue should  be clearly  distin- 
guished  from an analysis  of the impact  of the CPI on the economy, as 
wage determination  now is conducted. 
Donald  Nichols thought  that  much  of the controversy  between  Robert 
Hall's  approach  and  that  of the paper  could  be resolved  by examining  the 
empirical  issue  of whether  nominal  wage  increases  would  fall in response 
to downward  shifts  in the price  level. If, in fact, nominal  wages  respond 
to the price  level and  not to changes  in direct  taxes,  the proposals  are not 
gimmicks.  Modigliani  commented  that the critical empirical  issue was 
whether  wages were determined  by a wage-wage  or by a price-wage 
mechanism  (or some combination  of the two). The effectiveness  of the 
proposals discussed by Robert Crandall-unlike the TIP plans-de- 
pended  on wages  following  prices,  at least to some extent.  James  Duesen- 
berry  elaborated  on this in terms  of Edward  Gramlich's  formulation  of 
the inflationary  process,  noting  the critical  role played  by the coefficients 
of the lagged  price  terms.  The cost-reducing  proposals  are  more  effective, 
not only if the coefficients  are larger,  but also if the lags are shorter. 
Arthur  Okun sought to qualify  Gramlich's  proposition  that one-shot 
reductions  in the price level had a permanent  effect  on the inflation  rate 
only if the world were accelerationist  and if it had a backward-looking 
price-wage  feedback.  First,  he noted,  if the  world  were  not accelerationist, 
not even a recession  would have a permanent  effect  on the inflation  rate. 
The one-shot reduction  in the price level achieved  through  cost-cutting 
would  still do as much  good and  have as lasting  an effect  in slowing  infla- 
tion as the same  reduction  achieved  through  a one-shot  dose of extra  un- 
employment.  Second,  he suggested  that a forward-looking  process  based 
on rational  expectations  of future  real wages could yield parallel  results 
to those  of the backward-looking  model. 
William  Poole was concerned  about the pitfall that economists  might 
encounter  if they advocated  regulatory  or tax changes merely because 
they  were anti-inflationary.  He thought  that a clear distinction  should  be 
made  between  policies that were advocated  on the grounds  of efficiency 
and equity  and those that were advanced  only for anti-inflationary  pur- 
poses. To him, the efficiency  and equity benefits  of some of Crandall's 
proposals  were important  and deserved emphasis. George Perry and 
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economists  should  be prepared  to acknowledge.  For example,  one might 
rationally  favor  policies for energy  deregulation  because  of their alloca- 
tive efficiency  benefits  even though  they were inflationary.  Baily insisted, 
however,  that  the inflationary  costs should  be recognized. 
The participants  were especially  interested  in proposals  to lower the 
price level by substituting  direct  for indirect  taxation.  Poole saw such a 
strategy  as an attempt  to tamper  with the workings  of price indexes;  he 
thought  it might prove counterproductive.  People would recognize  the 
increased  burden  of direct  taxes  and  take  steps  to preserve  their  real after- 
tax incomes  by dropping  the use of price indexes  as a standard.  Duesen- 
berry  cited experiences  in Massachusetts  that revealed  the suspicions  of 
voters confronted  by a suggested  shift from sales taxes to income taxes; 
he inferred  that the voters  saw the shift as a hidden  way to increase  gov- 
ernment  expenditures.  To be credibly  anti-inflationary,  in his view a plan 
for a shift  in the composition  of taxes  had to be accompanied  by a ceiling 
on state  and  local spending. 
Walter  Heller thought  that,  in developing  a social bargain  for a wage- 
restraint  program,  a payroll  tax reduction  would  probably  be more effec- 
tive than an income tax cut. The payroll  tax cut would provide  a clearly 
perceived,  readily  calculated  increase  in take-home  pay for a given  wage, 
while  the benefits  of income-tax  cuts vary  among  workers  doing  the same 
job, depending  on family  size,  deductions,  and  the  like. 
Modigliani  cited evidence  from  studies  on the Dutch and  British  econ- 
omies that higher  direct  taxes raised  wages  and hence the price level. He 
thought  that this issue might  deserve  further  investigation  in the United 
States.  Modigliani  noted that, to the extent that direct  taxes are not sig- 
nificantly  shifted  forward  in higher  wages,  the proper  response  of policy 
to the explosion  of oil prices  in 1974 would  have been a large  reduction 
of indirect  taxes that neutralized  the price-level  impact, together  with 
some offsetting  increase  in direct  taxes. 
In the discussion  of the regulation  issues raised  by the paper,  Charles 
Holt enthusiastically  supported  Crandall's  idea of having government 
regulatory  agencies  budget  the costs they imposed  on the private  econ- 
omy.  He noted  that  some  regulatory  actions  had effects  similar  to tax col- 
lections and public expenditures  but lacked a comparable  technique  of 
control  under  current  procedures.  In his judgment,  the main  payoff  from 
the budgeting  proposal  would come from greater  efficiency  rather  than 
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that  some  problems  reflected  a peculiar  antieconomic  bias that  officials  of 
regulatory  agencies  develop  in focusing  solely on their  social objectives. 
Martin  Feldstein,  however, was skeptical  of the feasibility  and useful- 
ness of ex ante estimates  of regulatory  burdens.  He doubted  the quality 
and  objectivity  of such estimates  and questioned  the ability  to detect and 
control  "cost-overruns"  ex post. 
Arnold  Packer  saw  the need  for a survey  of the  possibilities  for reforms 
to reduce  costs and improve  efficiency  in the private  sector. Among the 
areas  of possible  inefficiencies  in private  institutions,  he mentioned  casu- 
alty  and  malpractice  insurance,  "wild-cat"  strikes,  and  unnecessarily  wide 
seasonal  fluctuation  in construction. 
Some panel members  stated  that certain  other aspects  of government 
policy deserved  more attention  than Crandall  had given them. Feldstein 
suspected  that Crandall's  estimate  of the inflationary  effects of the in- 
creased  minimum  wage-based  on Gramlich's  work-was  too low and 
did not fully account  for its effects  in shifting  up the entire  wage  structure. 
Gramlich  replied that, in fact, half of Crandall's  estimated  increase  in 
overall  wages  consisted  of indirect  effects  of the minimum  wage  on wages 
above  the minimum.  Crandall  noted that  Perry  had failed  to find  any sig- 
nificant  effect of minimum  wages, and Ulman suggested  that, in light of 
the empirical  evidence,  perhaps  economists  devoted  too much attention 
to the inflationary  effects  of the minimum  wage. 
Michael Lovell and Baily felt that Crandall  had underestimated  the 
potential  of more  vigorous  antitrust  policies.  Lovell mentioned  that some 
success  had been achieved  in lowering  legal fees, and that antitrust  mea- 
sures  might  be effective  in other  service  branches,  such as real estate  and 
travel  agents. 
Heller  reminded  the panel  that  deregulatory  measures  took a long time 
to be implemented.  He pointed out that actions  now being taken to de- 
regulate  airlines  were first  proposed  during  the Kennedy  administration. 
He counseled  the current  advocates  of deregulation  not to be discouraged 
if they  failed  to obtain  prompt  results. 